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SUMMARY 
The practice of medicine is constantly changing as technology enables us to redefine our 
understanding of the pathophysiological basis of disease. These new medical techniques 
and technologies often raise new moral and ethical dilemmas, forcing us to constantly 
reflect on our practice of bioethics, and to keep it relevant if we do not want to create a 
bioethical void.  
Neoplastic diseases, like colon and breast cancer, are sometimes associated with genetic 
abnormalities, some of which are inherited. A number of hereditary cancer syndromes have 
been identified, including Lynch syndrome.  
Two issues, related to scientific developments in the fields of histopathology and molecular 
pathology, and both of which are of importance to the histopathologist and the 
clinician/genetic counsellor, are discussed in this thesis. 
The first issue relates to the apparent merging of the concepts of the genotype and 
phenotype, and the consequences of such a unified concept. I believe that the staggered  
approach to obtain consent for the examination of a histopathology specimen, is outdated 
in view of the availability of a whole range of modern techniques and technologies, which 
allow us to analyse any point along the genotype – phenotype spectrum. Some 
investigations straddle the concepts of genotype and phenotype, and it is not always clear 
whether these investigations may be performed without the specific consent of the patient. 
If we accept a merged concept of the genotype and phenotype, I believe best clinical and 
ethical practice would be to obtain specific informed consent for the histopathology 
examination of the specimen in advance. This consent must be comprehensive and inclusive 
of all investigations, including genetic testing for both somatic and germline mutations. 
My second argument is based on the ownership of genetic information related to hereditary 
cancer syndromes. It does sometimes happen for various reasons, including the fear of 
stigmatisation or discrimination, that the index patient refuses to disseminate this 
information to his family. The ethical dilemma then arises whether the healthcare worker 
can divulge this information without the necessary consent and against the index patient’s 
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express wishes. This dilemma hinges mainly on two ethical issues, i.e. confidentiality and 
privacy.   
An analysis of the professional guidelines as well as current legislation and case law, is 
supportive of my opinion that the right to confidentiality and privacy is not absolute, and 
that this information may be divulged to at-risk family members.  
The ethical and moral implications are analysed from the perspective of the three main 
ethical and moral theories – virtue ethics (especially the virtue of phronesis as basis of an 
ethics of responsibility), utilitarianism and deontology – as well as the principles of 
biomedical ethics as formulated by Beauchamp and Childress.  
I believe that there is professional, legal and also moral justification to divulge important 
and potential life-saving information regarding the possibility of a hereditary cancer 
syndrome to at-risk family members. In fact, there is a duty to do so.   
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OPSOMMING 
Die praktisering van geneeskunde verander gedurig soos tegnologiese vooruitgang ons 
begrip aangaande die patofisiologiese basis van siektes herdefinieer. Hierdie nuwe mediese 
tegnieke en tegnologie skep dikwels nuwe morele en etiese dilemmas. Dit forseer ons om 
gedurig te reflekteer oor ons praktisering van bio-etiek, dit relevant te hou, en so te verhoed 
dat ‘n morele leemte ontstaan. 
Neoplastiese siektes, soos kolon- en borskanker, is soms assosieerd met genetiese 
abnormaliteite, waarvan sommige daarvan oorerflik is. ‘n Aantal oorerflike kanker sindrome 
is reeds identifiseerd, insluitende Lynch sindroom.  
Twee aangeleenthede wat spruit uit die wetenskaplike vooruitgang in die mediese 
dissiplines van histopatologie en molekulêre patologie, en wat beide van belang is vir die 
histopatoloog en die klinikus/genetiese raadgewer, word in hierdie tesis bespreek. 
Die eerste kwessie spruit uit die skynbare samesmelting of eenwording van die konsepte 
van die genotipe en fenotipe, en die gevolge van sodanige  verenigde konsep. Ek glo dat die 
stapsgewyse benadering om toestemming te verkry vir histopatologie ondersoeke 
oudmodies is, in die lig van die beskikbaarheid van ‘n hele reeks moderne tegnieke en 
tegnologie, wat ons in staat stel om enige punt op die genotipe-fenotipe spektrum te kan 
analiseer. Sommige ondersoeke oorbrug die konsepte van genotipe en fenotipe en dit is nie 
altyd duidelik of die ondersoek uitgevoer mag word sonder die spesifieke toestemming van 
die pasiënt nie. Ek glo dat as ons ‘n verenigde konsep van die genotipe en fenotipe aanvaar, 
dit dan die beste kliniese en etiese praktyk sal wees om spesifieke ingeligte toestemming vir 
die histopatologiese ondersoek vooraf te verkry. Hierdie toestemming moet omvattend 
wees en al die ondersoeke insluit, insluitende moontlike genetiese toetse vir sowel 
somatiese en kiemlyn mutasies. 
My tweede argument is baseer op die eienaarskap van genetiese inligting wat verband hou 
met oorerflike kanker sindrome. Soms gebeur dit dat die indeks pasiënt weens verskeie 
redes, soos die vrees van stigmatisering en diskriminasie, weier om hierdie inligting deur te 
gee aan die familie. Die etiese dilemma ontstaan dan of die gesondheidswerker by magte is 
om hierdie inligting te openbaar sonder die nodige toestemming en teen die uitdruklike 
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wense van die indeks pasiënt. Hierdie dilemma berus grotendeels op twee etiese aspekte, 
naamlik vertroulikheid en privaatheid. 
‘n Ontleding van die professionele riglyne asook huidige wetgewing en hofuitsprake 
ondersteun my mening dat die reg tot vertroulikheid en privaatheid nie absoluut is, en dat 
hierdie inligting openbaar mag word aan die familielede blootgestel aan die risiko. 
Die etiese en morele implikasies word benader vanuit die perspektief van drie belangrike 
etiese en morele teorieë – die etiek gebaseer op deugde (veral phronesis as deug en as basis 
van ‘n etiek van verantwoordbaarheid), utilitarianisme en deontologie - asook die beginsels 
van biomediese etiek soos formuleer deur Beauchamp en Childress. 
Ek glo dat daar professionele, wetlike en ook morele regverdiging bestaan om belangrike en 
potensieel lewensreddende inligting aan familielede met ‘n risiko vir ‘n oorerflike kanker 
sindroom, oor te dra. Daar is inderwaarheid ‘n plig om dit te doen. 
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1 Introduction 
For centuries, man has been aware that some families may harbour certain familial 
characteristics and traits. These may manifest as unique physical or mental features 
covering the whole spectrum, ranging from the desired to the undesired. Some of these 
traits include the tendency to develop certain diseases, like cancer.  
Even before the discovery of the double helix structure of DNA1 by Watson and Crick in 
1953, geneticists were able to track the inheritance of an abnormal gene by compiling a 
family pedigree or tree. Lacking the detailed knowledge of the structure of genes, which we 
possess today in the post-Human Genome Project era, the specific genetic abnormality or 
mutation was often unknown (Coleman and Tsongalis 2009; Turnpenny and Ellard 2012; 
Rooney 2009). Karyotyping of chromosomes (cytogenetics) enabled the morphological 
identification of chromosomal abnormalities as the underlying genetic mechanism for 
conditions like trisomy 21 or Down’s syndrome. Molecular genetics enabled us to detect the 
underlying genetic abnormality in Mendelian diseases, like cystic fibrosis. Although these 
techniques were accurate, it was slow and expensive processes. In addition the low 
resolution of chromosome analysis, which may leave the deletion of 5 million base pairs of 
DNA undetected, as well as the limited capacity of molecular genetics to sequence more 
than a few hundred base pairs at a time, were all limiting factors (Urban 2015, p.545). 
During the last two to three decades, technological developments in molecular medicine 
and pathology have opened a complete new world to scientists. New scientific techniques, 
like next generation gene sequencing supported by unlimited bio-information capacity, are 
able to generate and analyse vast amounts of genetic information rapidly and accurately. 
These techniques have evolved from research tools into sophisticated commercialised 
instrumentation, to become an integrated part in the armamentarium of most modern 
diagnostic pathology laboratories.  
Modern science has provided humankind not only with an understanding of the concept of 
genetics down to the base pairs forming the structure of our DNA, but has also explored the 
                                                          
1
 Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) is a double helix molecule that carries the genetic code of all known living 
organisms and many viruses. It is arranged in the cellular nucleus in structures called chromosomes. 
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concepts and roles of other non-genetic factors, like epigenetics and the science of the 
“-omes” and “-omics” (Wiki Series 2011). Not only has it highlighted the important roles 
played by each of these fields, like proteomics (addressing the proteome2), metabolomics 
(addressing the metabolome3), etc., in giving physical and physiological structure to the cell 
and ultimately the organism, but it has also emphasised the interdependent role of all these 
different genetic as well as non-genetic concepts. Genes and their products are usually 
central to many of these new fields of interest. 
Continuous developments in molecular and genetic pathology, and to a lesser extent 
histopathology, not only vastly expand our scientific knowledge in an exponential manner, 
but as in the case with many other scientific developments in the field of medicine, also 
result in its fair share of ethical and moral dilemmas. A well-known example is the “Scribner 
Shunt” in the 1960’s, forcing philosophers and ethicists to formulate policies on issues like 
the allocation of scarce resources (Jonsen 1990, p.17). Dialysis was invented in the 1940’s by 
Willem Kolff, but it only provided temporary relief for those patient suffering from severe 
renal failure. Arterial and venous access is required for dialysis, but the repeated vascular 
cannulation damages the vessels, and with time vascular access becomes impossible. Doctor 
Belding Scribner developed a shunt, or artificial vascular bypass, which is inserted in the 
forearm of the patient and provides a site or portal for repeated access to the vascular 
system. This innovating idea drastically improved the survival rate of patients with chronic 
renal failure, and therefore also the number of individuals requiring life-long dialysis. 
Unfortunately, dialysis machines were not freely available and at the Seattle Artificial Kidney 
Centre a committee of laypersons had to select those individuals qualifying for chronic 
dialysis, and by implication earmarking those eligible for survival. This group was known as 
the “life or death committee”, or also as the “God committee”. It highlighted the bioethical 
issues associated with the allocation of scarce medical resources and in particular its 
potential discriminatory effect. 
Ironically, the fact that a resource is freely available, may sometimes also have a down-side. 
The irresponsible and often inappropriate use of highly potent broad spectrum antibiotics 
                                                          
2
 The proteome represents all the proteins expressed by a cell or organism, and it may vary from time to time 
depending on the cellular cycle or other factors, including the effect of other proteins, like hormones, on the 
cell. 
3
 The metabolome represents all the metabolites in a cell or organism produced  by the cellular processes. 
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has led to the emergence of highly resistant bacterial strains or “super-bugs”. Antibiotic 
stewardship committees now monitors, and often controls, the prescription of the newer 
generations of antibiotics in hospitals, and patients (and their physicians) no longer have 
uncontrolled access to this resource.  
Medicine will always be in a constant process of scientific evolution and the new available 
techniques and technology will often push our boundaries of competence – not only a 
matter of what we are able to do, but also our knowledge of the individual patient, including 
his genetic make-up. Jonsen (ibid., p.19) highlighted this interaction between scientific 
medical development and bioethics, by stating “the task of bioethics is, in my view, to 
preserve the wisdom and to remedy the weakness, in the hope of formulating a new ethics 
to guide the new medicine.” 
New technologies, like the Human Genome Project, bring with them new ethical, legal and 
social implications (ELSI), and these issues need to be addressed. 
One of the central issues in genetics stems from the fact that genetic information is not only 
a reflection of the genetic make-up of the individual at stake, but also of the biological or 
genealogical family, and to some extent, even society and humankind. The primary aim of 
genetic testing, like most other modalities in medicine, is to benefit the patient. 
Unfortunately, it does carry risks like invasion of privacy, stigmatisation and discrimination.  
In some cases, the clinical presentation and morphological appearance of a tumour may 
alert the pathologist and clinician to the possibility of an underlying genetic abnormality. A 
family history will be further supportive of the possibility of a hereditary cancer syndrome. 
Lynch syndrome is an example of such a condition (see annexure A for a synopsis of this 
syndrome). 
As a histopathologist by profession and not a molecular pathologist or geneticist, I can be 
regarded as a “user” of the information produced by these experts. I am not a technical 
expert in this field, and only have a rough understanding and working knowledge of these 
techniques and their application to histopathology practice. The aim of the thesis is 
therefore more to focus on the bio-ethical implications of the knowledge generated by 
these analyses, rather than to comment on the technology itself.   
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In this thesis, a brief background of the science of histopathology and molecular pathology, 
as well as the significance of hereditary cancer syndromes (chapter 2), will be followed by a 
discussion on our changing perspective of medicine and genetics (chapter 3). This will be 
followed by a discussion of the concepts of phenotype and genotype (chapter 4), and the 
consequences of the apparent merging of these two concepts.   
A review of the current ethical and legal positions on the “ownership” of genetic 
information will attempt to define the “playing field”. This will include a discussion of the 
interests of different parties in an individual’s genetic information (chapter 5). Ethical issues 
in genetic testing, including consent, confidentiality and privacy, as well as professional 
guidelines which may assist the health care practitioner to apply these principles and rules 
in everyday practice, will be dealt with extensively (chapter 6). The issue of non-disclosure, 
and specifically the reasons why people do not want to disclose genetic information will be 
dealt with in chapter 7. A review of the relevant legislation, professional guidelines and case 
law will be given in chapter 8.     
In the latter part of this thesis, I will formulate and state my position on the following two 
issues. Firstly, I will argue that as a result of scientific developments the concepts of 
genotype and phenotype have merged into one entity, and that our consent procedures for 
the surgical removal of cancer specimens must allow the comprehensive histopathology 
analysis thereof to enable the maximum generation of information (chapter 9).   
Secondly, the ethical and moral approach to address the bio-ethical dilemmas related to 
genetic testing, and especially the ownership of information, will be discussed in chapter 10. 
An approach based on virtue ethics, and in particular an ethics of responsibility based on the 
virtue of phronesis,  will be promoted as the most appropriate theory. Three other theories - 
utilitarianism, deontology and the four principles of Beauchamp and Childress - will also 
briefly be referred to, to identify potential conflict and/or coherence amongst the different 
theories. This thesis concludes with a few words on the future of genetic testing as part of 
the rapidly evolving molecular diagnostic science, and its role in a more holistic approach in 
individualised medicine, as well as a final brief summary of my position (chapter 11).     
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2 Scientific background 
To be able to understand where we are at present, we need to know where we are coming 
from in our journey through medical science. A brief discussion of the background of the 
development of histopathology and molecular pathology is therefore appropriate.  
  
2.1 Histopathology 
Histopathology is the discipline in medicine dealing with the examination of tissue samples. 
The early medical practitioners were aware that certain tumours or neoplasms grow as 
lumps with a crab-like (cancer) infiltrating appearance, ultimately leading to the demise of 
the patient. Inventions and innovations, like the development of the microscope by Antoni 
van Leeuwenhoek (1632 – 1723) and the use of dyes to stain tissue sections, opened a vast 
new field for the examination of these tumours, as well as other organisms including 
bacteria and fungi. The foundations of histopathology were finally laid when Rudolph 
Virchow (1821 – 1902) published Die Cellularpathologie in 1858, describing medical 
conditions on cellular level and establishing a link between the morphological findings and 
the disease (Rooney 2009; Strathern 2005). 
Although histopathology also includes the diagnosis of inflammatory and non-neoplastic 
disease processes, like acute appendicitis and skin conditions, the examination of tumours 
or neoplasms is a very important field of practice for the histopathologist. Not only is it 
important to differentiate between benign and malignant tumours, but also to assess the 
possible prognostic features of a malignant tumour. The latter include the grading of the 
tumour, which reflects the degree of differentiation of the tumour cells, as well as invasion 
of blood and lymphatic vessels, which indicates a higher risk for metastases elsewhere in the 
body (Kumar et. al. 2015; Rosai 2011). 
For many years, the information produced by histopathology examination was limited to the 
light microscopy appearance of the tissue and the individual cells. Electron microscopy 
allowed a higher magnification of the structure of cells, but to determine the functionality of 
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a cell was often a matter of inference. For instance, a cell with large amounts of keratin 
intermediary filaments was regarded as an epithelial cell, while a cell containing myofibrils 
represented a muscle cell with the ability to contract. 
The antibody-antigen reaction forms the basis of many clinical laboratory techniques. A 
major development in the scope of histopathology over the last 30 - 40 years was the 
application of this technique to histopathology, where specific antibodies bind to targeted 
tissue antigens, and can then be marked for visualisation through the microscope. This 
technique is called immunohistochemistry (Taylor and Cote 2006; Dabbs 2014).  
Immunohistochemistry enables us to evaluate a number of different aspects of a cell: the 
line of origin, function, expression of genetic products, like proteins, as well as the 
proliferative activity. By looking through a bright-field microscope, we are now able to 
visualise both the structural and functional components of a particular cell. In other words, 
we are now also able to visualise the expression of some of the genetic characteristics of a 
particular cell. 
 
2.2 Molecular pathology  
The second important development since the last decades of the previous century is the 
application of molecular pathology techniques in histopathology (Turnpenny and Ellard 
2012). Although there are some differences in the concepts of molecular pathology and 
genetic pathology, the two terms will be used interchangeably for the sake of this 
discussion.4 Molecular pathology enables us to identify abnormalities or mutations in the 
DNA sequence, which may translate into genetic abnormalities ultimately expressed as a 
disease. This rapidly expanding field of science and medicine is associated with an 
exponential increase in our knowledge about different tumours and diseases; not only 
whether there is a hereditary risk, but also to establish the best treatment option and to 
assist in the prognostication of a tumour. 
                                                          
4
 As molecular and genetic pathology involves so many different pathology sub-disciplines, more and more 
authors prefer the term “molecular diagnostics”. 
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Different techniques can be used to analyse genetic abnormalities; these include the use of 
genetic probes and the sequencing of the genetic code. Techniques, like fluorescent in-situ 
hybridisation (FISH), are relatively simple to use, whilst others require more specialised 
platforms and expertise.  The FISH technique is based on the use of fluorescein-marked 
probes to determine the presence or absence of specific DNA sequences on chromosomes, 
which is then visualise by means of a fluorescent microscope.  
What is the significance of all these developments in histopathology? By looking down his 
microscope, albeit with the use of antibody-antigen reactions and genetic probes, the 
modern day histopathologist can now analyse the morphological structure, function and 
even the genetic abnormalities of a cell. As the type of tumour is a function of the 
underlying genetic abnormality or mutation, there is a real possibility that the future role of 
histopathologists in the management of tumours may be limited to the reporting on the 
adequacy of resection margins, with molecular pathology dealing with the diagnosis and 
classification of the tumour itself (Louis et. al. 2014). Histopathology, like medicine in 
general as viewed by William Osler, is not an exact science, but rather an art, based on 
science (Beam 1985, p.17). Interpersonal variance amongst histopathologists is a well-
known problem in the diagnosis and especially the classification of tumours (Rosai 2011). A 
genetic-based classification system will solve this problem.  
 
2.3 Somatic mutations 
Genetic mutations can be either germline or somatic mutations (Turnpenny and Ellard 
2012).  Any tumour has the ability to undergo somatic mutations as part of the ongoing 
process of biological transformation and anaplasia5. Some of these mutations may for 
instance increase the ability of the tumour cells to invade blood vessels and therefore the 
risk of haematogenous spread or metastases. It is important to realise that these changes at 
molecular level are unique to that particular tumour; it was neither inherited nor will it be 
transmitted to the offspring of the patient – it is therefore somatic.   
                                                          
5
 Anaplasia refers to the loss of differentiation by malignant cells. During this process it loses the 
characteristics of the normal mature cell. 
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The presence or absence of some mutations will also predict the response to so-called 
targeted drug therapy. These mutations are used to predict the prognosis and treatment 
response (pharmacogenomics6) for that particular tumour. Some of these drugs, like 
Herceptin for the treatment of breast cancer patients with Her-2 receptor overexpression, 
are expensive, but relatively commonly used in oncology practice and paid by most 
healthcare funders in South Africa, although there was initially some objection from 
healthcare funders. Other newer targeted oncotherapy drugs, like those for colorectal 
cancer, is usually a very expensive treatment, and the financial implications of this 
treatment result in its own ethical and moral dilemmas. Firstly, from a health care funder’s 
perspective (including the public health sector) a utilitarian can argue that it is better to 
invest the money into screening programmes, like colonoscopies, with the potential to save 
the lifes of a couple of people, rather than paying more than R500 000 for the treatment of 
a single patient, just to add a couple of weeks or months to the survival period. Secondly, 
the question can also be asked whether it is ethical to perform an analysis to determine 
whether a patient is a suitable candidate for a particular drug, knowing in advance that 
neither will the patient be able to afford this expensive treatment, nor will it be covered by 
the healthcare insurance? In this scenario, knowledge of this information is worthless. 
Having this knowledge, but not being able to use it to your advantage due to financial 
constraints, may create feelings of frustration, despair and even discrimination.  
To prevent the generation of potentially inappropriate or unnecessary information, the 
application of genetic testing to generate pharmacogenomical information needs a 
“gatekeeper”. The most appropriate person is the oncologist who knows best whether a 
patient would either be a suitable candidate who may benefit from a particular drug, or 
would be in a position to afford it. Having said that, section 6 of the National Health Act 
(2003) places an obligation on the healthcare practitioner, stating specifically that a user 
must be informed of “the range of diagnostic procedures and treatment options generally 
available to the user”  (my emphasis). Most clinicians will agree that the word “generally” is 
open to interpretation, and may not necessarily include treatment like pharmacogenomics. 
The oncologist is in the best position to decide what is the most appropriate information to 
                                                          
6
 Pharmacogenomics: the application of genetic information to determine the susceptibility of cancer cells for 
a specific drug or an individual’s genetic encoded response to a particular pharmacological drug.   
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be conveyed to the patient, and to guide the pathologist to perform the necessary tests to 
obtain information of a pharmacogenomic nature.    
 
2.4 Germline mutations   
On the other hand, germline mutations are inherited and transmitted from one generation 
to another, usually according to Mendelian principles (Turnpenny and Ellard 2012). It 
therefore not only reflects the genetic profile of that particular patient (and tumour), but 
also that of the parents and even the extended family. To complicate matters even more, 
other genetic factors like penetrance7 and expression of variance8 will also play a role. 
Having an abnormal gene may therefore not necessarily result in the development of any, or 
some, of the clinical manifestations of a disease.  
Some diseases and syndromes are monogenic in origin, while others are polygenic with 
more than one genetic abnormality at play. Most diseases however, are multifactorial in 
origin with genetic, environmental, dietary and other epigenetic factors all playing a role 
(Kumar et. al. 2015). In this latter group, the genetic factors are so integrated with and 
diluted by the other factors, that it is almost impossible to calculate and predict the 
hereditary risk to develop a particular disease in an objective and scientific manner. These 
diseases therefore seldom present as an ethical problem. Monogenetic, and to a lesser 
extent polygenetic, diseases are different as the disease or syndrome can be reduced to a 
single mutation, which can be transmitted (and traced) from one generation to another. 
 
2.5 Hereditary cancer syndromes  
Some cancers arise in individuals who carry a germline mutation (Turnpenny and Ellard 
2012; Kumar et. al. 2015; Rosai 2011). The genetic predisposition, and therefore the ability 
to identify individuals who may be at risk, has been well established for cancers of the 
                                                          
7
 Penetrance: the percentage of people with the genetic abnormality who will develop the disease/tumour. 
8
 Variance of expression: the various phenotypical expressions of the genetic abnormality, like different types 
of tumours in Lynch syndrome. 
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colon, breast, stomach, uterus, ovary, thyroid as well as other sites. Lynch syndrome (see 
annexure A) is a well-known example of such a syndrome (Vogelzang 2013). These germline 
mutations may result either in the activation of a promoter gene/cancer-predisposing gene 
or the loss of a cancer suppression gene, as well as in the abnormal coding for proteins and 
other cellular components.  
The identification of such a cancer-related mutation enables the geneticist to offer 
predictive genetic testing to the other family members, who may still be asymptomatic or in 
a pre-clinical stage. It creates the opportunity to institute preventive measures through 
“targeted surveillance, chemoprevention and risk-reducing surgical options” (Harris et. al. 
2005, p.301).  
 It is also important to consider those cases where there may be a high clinical suspicion of a 
hereditary cancer syndrome, but genetic analysis fails to detect a genetic abnormality. Even 
a “negative” result may not be that straightforward.  
First, it may be a false negative result, for the reasons to be discussed, i.e. a rare and not yet 
identified mutation (see the discussion on the family, section 5.3). This may give a false 
sense of well-being to the individuals. Second, information of having had a genetic test 
performed in the past, may have to be shared with other third parties, like insurance 
companies when applying for insurance or healthcare cover. This will also affect other 
family members, as the application and health questionnaire may enquire whether any 
other family members had undergone genetic testing in the past, which may potentially be 
used to exclude certain conditions from the benefits or may result in higher premiums. 
Due to the development of more sophisticated and readily available genetic techniques, 
hereditary cancer syndrome is becoming a growing group of diseases. This thesis specifically 
addresses one important aspect of the management of these diseases, i.e. who is the owner 
and guardian of the generated genetic information. 
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3 Our changing perspective of medicine and genetics 
3.1 The concepts of health and disease 
The medical profession is often regarded as the oldest profession in the world. However, 
between the practice of medicine of the past and antiquity and the medicine of the present 
is an abyss filled with different concepts and understanding of health and disease. The lack 
of knowledge of basic anatomy, physiology and pathology concepts in the past led to the 
mystification of disease and illness, and this often created the hieratic and theocratic beliefs 
on the causes (and cures) of diseases (Rooney 2009, Orfanos 2007, Jonsen 1990).  
Human disease was originally seen as a supernatural event or as punishment for sins and 
living an unpure life in the eyes of the gods or not keeping to the prescribed rituals. It was 
also sometimes perceived to be an invasion by an evil spirit. The healing process was 
therefore managed by priests in theocratic societies, or by witchdoctors, sorcerers or 
shamans in other primitive cultures.  
During the 10th and 9th centuries BC, the ancient Greeks conceived the concept of health, 
especially as seen from a Western perspective (Rooney 2009, Orfanos 2007, Jonsen 1990). 
This was deified in the goddess Hygieia, the daughter of the demigod Asklepios, son of 
Apollo and Koronis, a human female. Asklepios played a central role in ancient medicine. 
Hippocrates called the site where he practised medicine on the island Kos, Asklepieion, to 
recognise the role of the demigod in healing. The Hippocratic Oath also refers to the deities 
Apollo, Asklepios and Hygieia and medicine’s symbol still honours the role of Asklepios’s 
snake in healing the sick by a touch of the tongue. Finally, it appears as if Asklepios was 
most probably a victim of being “too competent”, as he was killed by Zeus while trying to 
save a man whose life was already condemned by the gods (Jonsen 1990, p.20). This 
scenario is still very relevant today. The issue of being “too competent” is a moral issue 
encountered more and more in modern medicine with our advanced life-supporting 
systems. In medicine there is a point where the clinician must allow nature to proceed on its 
own, or in the words of Hippocrates himself, as quoted in Jonsen (2006, p.670), “and not to 
attempt to cure those who are mastered by their disease”.           
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According to Hippocrates (460 – 375 BC) (Rooney 2009, p.18) the concept of “physis”, or of 
“disease”, was viewed “as a kind of physical dysfunction or disorder that leads to lack of 
mental and somatic completeness and strength and therefore makes life uncomfortable” 
(Orfanos 2007, p.852). He created the humoral theory, based on this belief and also taking 
into account the concept of nature as defined by the early Greek philosophers, like Thales, 
Pythagaros and Empedocles, as consisting of air, earth, water and fire, as well as Alcmaeon’s 
concept of elemental pairs of opposites. According to this theory, the four humours 
consisted of black bile, yellow bile, blood and phlegm, and had to be kept in balance to 
maintain good health. This was the dominant model of medicine in Europe and the Middle 
East from the 5th until the 19th century (Rooney 2009).  
Aristotle (384 – 322 BC) (Law 2007, p.248), who was born seven years before the death of 
Hippocrates (460 – 375 BC), also supported this theory. His interpretation of the Hippocratic 
texts, i.e. that “every symptom implied its own form of illness” contributed to his 
conceptualisation of logic (Strathern 2005, p.15). The humoral theory was further developed 
by the Greco-Roman doctor Galen (129 – c.216 AD) and by the Arab doctor Avicenna in the 
11th century. At its peak it did not only try to explain diseases, but also the temperaments of 
individuals; for instance, someone who has too much blood will be courageous, hopeful and 
amorous, while too much yellow bile will cause bad-temper and to be quick to anger 
(Rooney 2009, p.17). 
Hildegard of Bingen (b.1098) ingeniously succeeded in linking the humoral theory to religion 
(Strathern 2005, p.47). 
….the unbalanced nature of the four humours resulted from the fall of man in the 
Garden of Eden. After Adam ate the apple (the fruit of the knowledge of good and 
evil), its juices entered his blood and disturbed the humoral balance of his body. As a 
result, his blood was able to produce the poison of semen. This substance resulted 
from the foaming of the blood. In women, the same process resulted in the 
production of breastmilk. 
For her, sins resulted in an unbalanced state of the humours, and thereby caused disease.  
During the Middle Ages, when diseases like plaque (Black Death) killed one quarter of 
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Europe’s population between 1347 and 1350, some Christians attributed disease to the 
punishment and wrath of God. The story of the Biblical figure, Job, however did not support 
this argument; how could a righteous man such as him be afflicted by pestilence and disease 
(including even the possibility of having suffered from syphilis) (Cruse 1999) (Strathern 
2005, p.84).   
At the same time, most of the Eastern medical systems also promoted the importance of a 
system of balance as a requisite for health (Rooney 2009, p.13).  These included Ayurveda in 
India, the oldest surviving and continuing medical system, where a holistic approach to treat 
the body, mind and spirit together, was aimed at balancing the three doshas 
(wind/spirit/air, bile and phlegm) in the body. The Chinese system of yin and yang and the 
Buddhist and Hindu belief systems of chakras, or energy centres, are all based on the 
principle of balance as a requirement for health.  
Although Hippocrates did implement different medical terminology terms still in use today, 
like erythema for redness and alopecia for hair loss, he regarded illness or disease as one 
entity. In the Hippocratic tradition, disease, and the way it manifested itself, was “entwined 
with the life history of the patient suffering from it” (Van Niekerk 2002, p.228). The aim of 
medicine was thus to cure the sick by correcting the imbalances in the body in a holistic 
manner.  
It was only during the latter part of the previous millennium that a scientific approach to 
medicine, built on anatomy, physiology, pathology and pharmacology, developed. The 
proliferation of knowledge was the result of many factors, including a more liberal religious 
position on the dissection of corpses, the development of the printing press to disseminate 
knowledge and the development of the microscope. By identifying different causes for 
different diseases, it became not only possible to treat the sick, but also to prevent the 
development or spread of diseases. Thomas Sydenham was instrumental in the 
development of the science of pathology in which disease is not regarded as a uniform 
condition, but as different entities, caused by different agents and therefore requiring 
unique and specific treatments (Van Niekerk 2002, p.227). 
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Henry Sigerist (as cited in Jonsen 1990, p.84) explains this difference between Hippocratic 
medicine and the modern understanding of medicine as formulated by Sydenham, as 
follows: 
Hippocrates recognized only disease, not diseases. He knew only sick individuals, 
only cases of illness. The patient and his malady were for him inseparably connected 
as a unique happening, one which would never recur. But what Sydenham saw 
above all in the patient …. was the typical, the pathological process which he had 
observed in others before and expected to see in others again. In every patient there 
appeared a specific kind of illness. For him, maladies were entities, and his outlook 
upon illness was, therefore, ontological.  Hippocrates wrote the histories of sick 
persons, but Sydenham wrote the histories of diseases. 
A natural consequence of this scientific approach to medicine was the definition and 
formulation of a disease according to its etiology, pathophysiology, morphology, clinical 
manifestation, management, pharmacological therapy, and also prognosis. Genetic 
predispositions or abnormalities, as one of the causes for diseases and ailments, became 
more and more important as we started to understand this “unseen or invincible” science at 
play. 
 
3.2 The concepts of inheritance and genetics 
Since ancient times, the human race has been aware of the importance of inheritance, and 
especially the fact that some hereditary traits may be inferior or superior to others. The 
ancestral line of origin was also often central to the succession of power, and most Old 
Testament books deal extensively with the genealogy or family lineage of important Biblical 
characters.  
It was also in these ancient times that humans started the process of not only domesticating 
animals and crops, but also aiming to improve the quality of the produce. The first reference 
to the application of biotechnical manipulation is recorded in the book of Genesis, chapter 
30. This tells us how Jacob created a flock of superior goats by using the basic principles of 
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genetic selection and crossbreeding, much to the dismay of Laban, his father-in-law, as well 
as his brothers-in-law (Kegley 1998, p.72). 
Philosophers and physicians in Greco-Roman times also reflected on the concepts of 
inheritance. According to Retief and Cilliers (2001) the so-called Pre-Socratic Greek 
philosophers, like Anaximander, Alcmaeon, Hippo, Empedocles, Diogenes and Democritus, 
all formulated different theories during the sixth and fifth centuries BC. These philosophers 
postulated that the transfer of hereditary characteristics is the result of male and female 
semen or seed (or the female equivalent of semen). Opinion on where and how semen was 
produced in the body often differed and gave rise to a number of theories. These included 
the production of semen in the brain during coitus (the encephalogenic theory), passing 
along the spinal cord to the genitals (the encephalo-myelogenic theory) or absorbing all the 
characteristics of the organs and tissues as it passes through the body (the pangenesis 
theory). 
During the era of Hippocrates during the fifth and fourth centuries BC, physicians developed 
a complex hereditary theory, based on the humoral theory. They believed that both males 
and females produced seed, but other factors would determine the offspring’s 
characteristics (Retief & Cilliers  2001, p.96). These included the quantity and strength of the 
semen, the origin of semen (left or right side of the body), the site of uterine implantation, 
as well as the temperature and moistness of the parents’ bodies. 
Aristotle (4th century BC) promulgated a thesis based on the superiority of the male (op. 
cit.). According to him only the male produced semen and menstrual blood merely serves as 
a substance to facilitate growth of the embryo and fetus.  Although all children should 
ideally be born males resembling their fathers, other factors may influence the developing 
embryo to result in a spectrum of male-female offsprings with at the two opposing poles a 
male or female. These influences included the age of the parents, weather conditions, the 
type of water drunk, the viscosity of semen, etc. He rejected the pangenesis theory and 
stated that semen originated from the froth in the blood, produced by heat during coitus 
(the haematogenous theory). 
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For centuries, the concept that the reproductive processes was dominated by the male, who 
was by implication therefore responsible for most or even all of the hereditary traits of his 
descendants, was the accepted theory of procreation.  
 
3.3 The Mendelian gene and the molecular gene 
It was only when Gregory Mendel demonstrated the equal role and contribution of both 
parents to the creation of a gene pool with equal amounts of maternal and paternal genetic 
material, that the modern view on inheritance was established (Griffiths and Stotz 2013, 
p.10). Mendel, a Catholic monk and scientist, experimented on peas of different colours and 
heights. The concept of the Mendelian gene is based on different alleles at a specific locus 
on the chromosome, and the dominant or recessive nature of the allele will determine 
whether it will be expressed or not, depending also on whether it is homozygous or 
heterozygous9. 
For a long period of time, however, genetic analysis had to be performed mostly indirectly 
and by way of inference, as the analysis of genetic material was limited to observations at 
the chromosomal level. 
The Watson and Crick model of the DNA structure was the first step in understanding the 
building blocks of the encoded genetic information. As newer techniques developed, it 
became possible to sequence the genome and the genes associated with abnormalities in 
the human phenotype.   
The molecular gene is defined by the nucleotide sequence of a particular gene. Base pair 
changes, like deletions and insertions, in the nucleotide sequence may result in mutations. A 
specific genetic abnormality as identified by Mendelian genetics may be the result of 
different molecular genetic (and epigenetic) influences.    
                                                          
9
 Zygosity refers to the degree of similarity between the different alleles for a specific trait at a particular locus 
on a set of homologous chromosomes. Alleles are homozygous if they are identical and express the same trait. 
In the situation where both the alleles are recessive, the recessive trait will be expressed. If the alleles are 
heterozygous for a specific trait, only the dominant trait will be expressed   
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Griffiths and Stotz (2013, p.61) support this dual approach, recognising the importance of 
both the Mendelian and molecular gene: 
Instead, in one experimental context, that of hunting for the mutation responsible 
for the phenotype, the gene takes on its Mendelian identity, while in the other 
context, that of analysing the sequence, the gene takes on its molecular identity. 
So one clear sense in which Mendelian genetics does not reduce to molecular 
genetics is that it is not superseded by molecular genetics, but remains alongside it 
as another way of thinking about DNA. Molecular genetics did not reduce or replace 
Mendelian genetics, but enriched genetics with another way of think about genes: as 
Mendelian alleles and as sequences that template for a product. 
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4 Phenotype and genotype: a justifiable distinction? 
4.1 Introduction 
For many years, we viewed the phenotype and genotype of an individual as two completely 
separate concepts. These two concepts are defined by Richard Lewontin (2011, p.1) 
respectively as follows: 
The genotype is the descriptor of the genome which is the set of physical DNA 
molecules inherited from the organism’s parents. The phenotype is the descriptor of 
the phenome, the manifest physical properties of the organism, its physiology, 
morphology and behaviour. 
As will be discussed in more detail below, I believe that the boundaries of these two 
concepts have blurred to such an extent, that in fact, I would like to argue that they have 
merged and therefore need to be seen as different reflections of the same entity. Such a 
model has ethical implications in the way we practise medicine, and especially when dealing 
with the histopathology examination of a tumour. If we accept a unified concept with the 
phenotype and genotype only representing two reference points on a spectrum of 
expression of the human body, then we need to adapt our consent procedures and 
protocols to reflect this view, especially when dealing with the diagnosis and analysis of a 
tumour.  
I will discuss the present practice, or rather the lack thereof, regarding obtaining consent for 
the examination of histopathology specimens, and address the benefits of a unified 
approach. After a short review of the history of the concepts of genotype and phenotype, 
the argument that these two concepts have merged will be supported by a discussion on 
how techniques like immunohistochemistry and gene expression profiling have influenced  
histopathology analysis. This will be followed by a discussion of the consequences of such a 
merged and unified concept, and the implications this will have on the future duty of the 
modern histopathologist.    
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 Consent procedure for pathology investigations 4.1.1
Tissue specimens for histopathology examination are obtained during a surgical procedure. 
It is unfortunately common practice that the whole procedure to obtain consent for a 
surgical intervention or operation will focus primarily, and often exclusively, on the surgical 
aspects. These will include the type of anaesthetic procedure, the surgery and the 
consequences thereof, like the loss of an organ, and any possible complications. Any 
reference to the histopathology investigation is usually limited to a passing remark that the 
tissue will be sent to the laboratory for a pathologist to decide whether it is a benign or 
malignant lesion. No specific consent for the histopathology examination of the tissue is 
obtained.  
The above lack of consent for histopathology investigations is not unique, and is also seen in 
other pathology investigations, like haematology, biochemistry, etc. The demographic 
information required on the pathology request forms in use in South Africa usually have two 
different sections; one to be signed by the patient to consent to the investigation, and a 
section for the guarantor, if not the patient, accepting responsibility for payment of the 
laboratory investigations. The latter is also a legal requirement of the Consumer Protection 
Act (2008). Most pathology request forms, however, are returned unsigned to the pathology 
laboratory. In the hospital environment specifically, patients are either unconscious or 
critically ill when the specimen is collected, or only give implied consent by allowing the 
phlebotomist to collect the specimen. These aspects are of concern to pathology groups, as 
it carries both professional and legal risks.  
It is important that any interaction with the patient when obtaining consent for any surgical 
procedure, must be used as optimal and productive as possible. The consent obtained must 
be comprehensive enough to include any further testing of a specimen if deemed necessary. 
In practice, the clinician needs to inform the patient not only about the surgical procedure, 
but also that the specimen will be submitted for histopathology examination, and that, 
depending on the findings of the pathologist, further tests and analyses may be performed 
on the specimen, which may include genetic testing. Consent is an integral aspect of the 
respect for persons and their autonomy. It is therefore important that patients are allowed 
to make an informed decision on how the investigation and diagnostic work-up of their 
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tissue specimen will proceed, otherwise the pathologist may be blamed for acting 
paternalistic and even without the necessary consent.  
The alternative is to follow a more cumbersome and staggered approach, dictated by the 
type of tumour and its known potential genetic associations. First, only the morphological 
diagnosis of the tumour is performed with the implied consent of the patient, as this is the 
situation we usually found ourselves in at present. If the pathologist believes that the 
tumour may harbour somatic mutations, which may be of therapeutic/prognostic 
significance, informed consent for the performance of genetic testing to determine the 
presence or absence of these mutations needs to be obtained. Finally, if the pathologist 
identifies certain morphological features, which may indicate a hereditary cancer risk, 
additional informed consent for the performance of genetic studies to determine the 
presence of germline mutations has to be obtained. In practice, this approach is not only 
difficult and time consuming, but it also delays the final diagnoses, as the patient will have 
to be counselled at successive consultations as the histopathologist unravels the 
characteristics of a particular tumour. 
By merging the concepts of phenotype and genotype into one entity, consent obtain for the 
examination of the tissue specimen will be comprehensive and inclusive of both 
histopathology as well as any genetic studies, which may be deemed necessary. In other 
words, a proper consent procedure addressing all the aspects related to the examination of 
a tissue specimen will cover all the above aspects and procedures in advance and with the 
patient’s express consent and permission. 
 
4.2 Historical background to the concepts of genotype and 
phenotype 
The realisation that the hereditary and developmental characteristics of organisms differ, 
formed the basis on which Wilhelm Johannsen introduced the distinction between genotype 
and phenotype in 1908. He used an appearance-type (Erscheinungtypus) approach in his 
definition, stating that “the phenotype of an individual is thus the sum total of all his 
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expressed characters” (Johannnsen 1909, p.163, as cited in Nachtomy et. al. 2007, p.240). 
The definition of these two concepts by Richard Lewontin has already been mentioned, but 
it is important to emphasise his comprehensive definition of the phenome, as it not only 
limited to the physical properties of an individual, but it also comprises the intangible 
characteristics of the individual, i.e. its physiology and behaviour (Lewontin 2011, p.1).  
Two informational processing systems determine the ultimate phenotype expressed by an 
organism (Strohman 1987). The one is the genetic system where linear genetic rules govern 
the flow of information from DNA to RNA10, and ultimately proteins. At the same time, the 
epigenetic system allows for an interactive network with environmental signals, which then 
regulate the genome via a feedback loop and alter the patterns of gene expression. This 
latter pathway explains why no two individuals, including genetically identical twins or even 
cloned organisms, will be an exact copy with the same phenotype, whether physical, 
functional or behavioural. 
In the Mendelian era, this simplistic relationship between the genome and the phenome 
was acceptable. However, genetic and molecular studies have shown that our genome is not 
immune to external factors, which will also be expressed in our phenotype. Radiation, and 
its effect on both somatic and germ cells, is a well-known example. Most, if not all, tumours 
result from genetic information and control going haywire. Scientific developments in 
molecular pathology and histopathology are constantly changing our view of tumours; it is 
no longer only a cluster of malignant cells, but it has indeed been reduced into an encoded 
genetic event with consequences.  
 
4.3 Reductionism in medicine 
It is often said that the genetic code in living beings and medicine can almost be compared 
to the role of the atom in physics. Genetic determinism, or the term genetic essentialism as 
                                                          
10
 Ribonucleic acid (RNA) is a single-stranded molecule involved in various biological processes like coding and 
decoding of genetic information, regulation, and expression of genes. Different types of RNA exist, including 
messenger RNA (mRNA), transfer RNA (tRNA) and ribosomal RNA (rRNA). 
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used by Kegley (1998, p.48), is a form of reductionism and “the aim of reductionism is to 
show that one level of reality …. can be explained by a lower and ‘deeper’ level of reality”.  
Genetic determinism and reductionism carry the risk that it elevates the concept of the 
genotype to a sacrosanct position, ignoring the important role of external factors in defining 
the phenotype. The genotype, and the owner of the body in which it resides, is then 
believed to have the ultimate and final say and becomes the de facto gatekeeper of the 
scientific information locked up in the individual’s genetic code.   
There had been a change in our understanding of the concept of genetic determinism 
(Chadwick, et. al. 2014, p. 14). The original model was built on a “gene for x” approach, but 
the Human Genome Project identified far less genes that had been expected (20 500 versus 
100 000). As it was obvious that such a small number of genes could not solely be 
responsible for the complexity and diversity of the human species, it was argued that other 
factors must also play a role. The debate was therefore about “the difference between the 
ways in which a gene can influence rather than determine” (ibid., p.15).  Even so, the 
Human Genome Project is still of tremendous assistance in our understanding of the 
genetics of tumours, partly because it enables us to define the concept of the “normal”, or 
wild-type11, gene pool 
The emerging view of genetic determinism, which differs from the above “gene for X” 
concept, is the idea “that the genome in all its complexity is deterministic, taking into 
account the volume of data that can be made available of the precise sequence in an 
individual’s genome, including all the myriad ways in which he or she differs from other 
individuals” (ibid., p.15)(my emphasis). This includes the influence of epigenetic factors, like 
DNA methylation, histone modification, non-coding RNA (nc-RNA) and cytoplasmic 
inheritance on the expression of information encoded in the genetic sequence, the latter 
also called Crick information (Griffiths and Stotz  2013, p.109). 
The concept of genetic determinism appears to be more controversial in the field of 
behavioural genetics, where an attempt is often made to reduce human behaviour, 
including gender and sexuality, to a genetic base. In reality, only a few conditions can be 
                                                          
11
 The normal or non-mutated genetic sequence or gene is also known as the wild-type gene. 
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reduced to a single genetic abnormality. These are limited to the few truly monogenetic 
conditions, like Duchenne muscular dystrophy and haemophilia. Most other conditions, like 
hereditary cancer syndromes, are polygenetic and/or multifactorial in nature with 
epigenetic factors also playing an important role.  
There appears to be more sensitivity and respect for the information encoded in the genetic 
make-up of an individual, than for his physical and other tangible characteristics, like 
behaviour and intellect. As already stated, the genotype is regarded as almost being 
sacrosanct, while the phenotype is open to public scrutiny, criticism and even sometimes 
ridicule.  Is this genetic essentialism based on the argument that one cannot alter your 
genes, but that your physical, behavioural and other properties are to some extent the 
product of external factors and influences and may be modulated?  
We need to have a less strict definition of what is regarded as genetic determinism and 
genocentrism, and recognise the role of all other factors, like epigenetics and the 
environment, at play together with the genetic sequence in influencing, rather than 
determining, the phenotype. Such an approach is in line with my argument that we tend to 
be “over-protective” of information related to our genotype; in reality, our genetic material 
is only one part of our identity – physical, behavioural, emotional and intellectual.  In 
mathematical terms, the equation genotype = phenotype has rather changed into an 
approximation with genotype ≈ phenotype.   
 
4.4 Immunohistochemical definition of the phenotype  
The concept of medicine, and in particular our understanding of disease, has evolved 
through centuries into a scientific and evidence-based discipline. This was discussed in more 
detail in chapter 3. Even as a scientific-based profession, our understanding of pathology  
was for centuries limited to what we could see; at first only with the naked eye 
(macroscopy), but since the second half of the nineteen century also on a microscopic level. 
During the last couple of years, other techniques have developed which enable us to view 
cells in both a morphological and functional perspective. Firstly, we developed the ability to 
analyse the production and expression of proteins (receptors, enzymes, etc.) using 
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immunohistochemical stains (see p.15). Secondly, techniques like gene expression profiling, 
allow us to determine which genes are activated in a particular cell (Coleman and Tsongalis 
2009; Turnpenny and Ellard 2012). 
The impact of immunohistochemistry as a morphological reflection of the genetic 
information encoded in a tumour cell, can best be illustrated using two practical examples.   
Breast cancer is still the most common cancer amongst women in developed countries. We 
are able to determine the presence (qualitative and quantitative) of estrogen receptors in 
the breast cancer cell. This identifies the subgroup of breast cancers in which we can treat 
the patient with anti-estrogenic drugs, in an attempt to block these receptors and to inhibit 
tumour growth. Any clinician views this information as a vital and integral component of the 
histopathology report, and these tests are routinely performed without any specific consent 
obtained from the patient, other than the routine express consent for the operation and 
(usually) only the implied consent for the histopathology examination of the specimen. 
Although it reflects unique characteristics influence by the genetic profile of that particular 
tumour cell, it raises no ethical issues regarding the way that information must be treated as 
it only reflects a somatic cell change.  It does not reflect any germline or familial genetic 
trait. 
What is the situation in the diagnosis of Lynch syndrome where we can identify those 
individuals who may harbour a germline mutation, by using immunohistochemical staining 
techniques? Albeit not a diagnostic or confirmatory test and genetic confirmation is still 
required, it places the individual in a high-risk group.  Can these tests be performed without 
obtaining specific consent? Lynch syndrome is a fitting example of the blurring of the 
borders between the concepts of phenotype and genotype. In Lynch syndrome, one of the 
morphological presentations, although not specific for the condition, is the loss of mismatch 
repair (MMR) proteins. These proteins, or the lack thereof, can be demonstrated with 
immunohistochemistry stains. It may be argued that proteins are more on the phenotypic 
rather than the genotypic side of the fence, as they can be regarded as the building blocks 
for the cell and organism. However, they are the direct products of the genetic controlled 
amino-acid assembly system, and abnormal amino-acid sequences will result in abnormal 
proteins or the loss thereof.  
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The historic definition of the genotype and phenotype is only separated by one single step, 
i.e. the translation of the genetic sequence into the amino-acid sequence. It is merely a 
reflection of the same image in a mirror (genetic sequence versus amino-acid sequence) and 
reflects the collapse of the genotype-phenotype spectrum into one unified concept.  
When dealing with a possible case of Lynch syndrome the pathologist will be guided by an 
algorithm (see annexure A, p.106). In the work-up of the case, there is a transition from the 
morphological findings, like immunohistochemistry, to the genetic features. The exact point 
where this transition into the realms of genetic information occurs, is not properly defined. 
This is reflected by the fact that there are two schools of thought regarding the performance 
of immunohistochemistry to confirm/exclude mismatch repair protein loss. The majority of 
histopathologists regard immunohistochemistry as part of the work-up of the patient as a 
screening procedure based on the morphology of the tumour. As it is not a diagnostic tool 
for Lynch syndrome, they believe that it is permissible to be performed under the (non-
genetic) consent obtained for the surgery. However, there is a school who believe that 
immunohistochemistry, even though it is only a screening procedure, cannot be performed 
without the express consent of the patient (Kalloger et al., 2012). These two schools reflect 
the difference in understanding of the phenotype/genotype concept amongst 
histopathologists. 
 
4.5 Gene expression profiling defining the genotype or the 
phenotype? 
What about other techniques straddling the genotype-phenotype fence? Although gene 
sequencing has become common practice in medicine, both as a research and diagnostic 
tool, other techniques have also been developed to measure the activity and expression of 
genes by measuring and profiling the messenger RNA or mRNA in the cells. 
Along the genotype-phenotype spectrum, RNA, and specifically messenger RNA (mRNA), can 
be regarded as the interface between the genetic information encoded in the DNA of the 
genome in the nucleus, and amino acids, polypeptides or proteins as structural building 
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blocks in the cellular cytoplasm. It is at this interface where genetic information is translated 
into structure. It is now possible to determine the extent to which the genetic information 
encoded in the genome of a particular cell is expressed by analysing and measuring the 
expression of mRNA by a cell. This is called gene expressing profiling, and is done by 
microarray-based hybridisation assays. Like most laboratory techniques, the 
commercialisation of the newer generations of these tests has moved it from a research 
tool into general practice. 
Although all non-neoplastic somatic cells in an organism will for all practical purposes have 
the same identical DNA sequence, each different type of cell will have a unique expressed 
genetic profile, as its cell type and function will determine which proteins are required and 
therefore need to be produced by that particular cell type. The expressed genetic profile of 
the organism as a whole will therefore be the sum total of all the different profiles 
expressed by all the different cell types, and this may vary from time to time depending on 
the stage of development or the metabolism of the organism. 
Gene expressing profiling has for instance demonstrated that there are different types of 
breast ductal carcinoma. Morphologically these carcinomas may look the same, but they do 
not only arise from different cell types of the breast duct, but also show a difference in 
response to therapy and prognosis. Commercialised systems to predict prognosis and the 
need for adjuvant therapy, like Mammaprint® and OncotypeDX®, are already widely 
available, although its use in South African practice is still limited by cost factors. The point 
of interest is that no specific “genetic” consent is usually required for the performance of 
these tests.  
 
4.6  The consequences of the merging of the concepts of 
genotype and phenotype  
What are the practical implications in modern medicine, and in particular biomedical ethics, 
if the merging of the concepts of genotype and phenotype as a continuum of expression, is 
accepted? Such a unified concept will “defragment” the analysis of tissue specimens, and 
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will enable the pathologist or medical practitioner to obtain the maximum scientific 
information from the submitted specimen. 
When a surgical specimen is submitted for histopathology examination, good clinical 
practice requires that the pathologist will issue a comprehensive report which will include 
specific reference to: 1) the morphological diagnosis, including the tumour grade and 
prognostic features, like lymphovascular involvement; 2) adequacy of resection with specific 
reference to the surgical excision margins; 3) an indication of whether pharmacogenomic 
modalities may be of value in the treatment of the patient (like estrogen receptor or Her-2 
status in the case of breast cancer) and 4) comment on the possibility that the tumour may 
be the result of an inherited genetic abnormality. It is especially in these last two very 
important aspects, where the distinction between genotype and phenotype becomes 
difficult to justify.  
As stated above, it is standard practice to accept that the consent obtained for the 
operation and subsequent histopathology examination, albeit that the latter consent is 
usually implied and not necessarily express, will only include any genetic studies to 
determine response to therapy (pharmacogenomics) as well as prognosis. This is called 
“somatic genetic profiling” (Robson et. al. 2010, p.893).  Germline testing for the inherited 
predisposition of cancer falls at present outside the scope of the consent obtained for the 
surgery and examination of a tumour.  Even though the pathologist may have a high index 
of suspicion that the cancer may be due to a hereditary genetic disease, genetic testing to 
establish such an abnormality cannot proceed unless specific consent to that effect is 
obtained. I believe that this approach does not always serve the best interest of the patient, 
in particular as the clinician may inadvertently omit to inform the patient of this possible 
risk, especially in practice as the patient is usually referred by the surgeon to the oncologist 
for further management at this stage. It is known that in the fragmented world of super-
specialised medicine, important information can inadvertently be lost in the communication 
amongst all the different role-players. 
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4.7 The duty of the histopathologist 
If a tumour is submitted for histopathology examination, it is the responsibility of the 
pathologist to generate as much possible scientific information from that specimen, 
including whether the tumour is the result of a hereditary genetic effect. This forms an 
integral part of the information conveyed to the clinician, which will form the basis of the 
further management of the patient.  The primary aim is to benefit the patient. Not 
recognising the possibility that you may be dealing with a genetic syndrome, or not 
excluding such a possibility if it does feature in the assessment of the specimen, may put the 
patient at unnecessary risk for the development of other synchronous or metachronous 
tumours. At the same time, it may prevent at-risk family members from seeking genetic 
guidance and institute preventative measures.  
Not providing optimal care to the patient may amount to negligence. According to 
Beauchamp and Childress the professional model of due care, and therefore the criteria to 
assess negligence and medical malpractice, consists of the following elements (Beauchamp 
and Childress 2013, p.155): 
1. The professional must have a duty to the affected party. 
2. The professional must breach that duty. 
3. The affected party must experience a harm. 
4. The harm must be caused by the breach of duty. 
Although the histopathologist may not enjoy the same personal and intimate relationship 
with the patient as his clinical colleague, and may remain for all purposes anonymous to the 
patient, he nevertheless has a similar professional duty.   The patient has the right to expect 
that the professional duty of a histopathologist includes the assimilation of all relevant 
information related to a tumour. Failing to do so may result in harm and can be regarded as 
being professionally negligent.  
Identifying a genetic basis for a tumour is not necessarily only gloom and doom, as it may 
also harbour some good news for the patient. It is known that the prognosis of some 
tumours caused by a genetic syndrome is better than those tumours arising de novo.  
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It is therefore important that medical practitioners change the way consent is obtained 
when dealing with a possible malignant tumour. This consent must include consent for the 
performance for a complete, all-inclusive and comprehensive analysis of the specimen, 
including any genetic analysis deemed necessary by the pathologist.12 The final 
histopathology report on the specimen must therefore include the criteria as set out above, 
and in addition comment on the absence or presence of a hereditary cancer syndrome.  
It is important to note that we have so far only been dealing with the genetic information 
pertaining to the index patient or proband13. The further dissemination of the genetic 
information amongst family members, and in particular the issues of consent, confidentiality 
and privacy, will be discussed in more detail in the sections below.  
  
                                                          
12
 Although it is technically possible to perform any type of genetic testing on a tissue specimen, a blood 
specimen is preferred in practice due to the better preservation of DNA and RNA. 
13
 The index patient or proband is regarded as the first member of a family to have been identified as being at 
risk or affected. 
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5 Third parties and their interest in an individual’s 
genetic information 
The ownership of genetic information is central to the debate if, and to what extent, any 
individual can control the dissemination of information regarding his or her genetic profile 
especially if that information may identify potential hereditary genetic risks for other family 
members. We share so much genetic information, not only amongst ourselves as human 
beings, but even with other species, like primates. This places an individual in a central 
position in as far as the flow of genetic information is concerned; not only will he be able to 
analyse his own genetic profile, but this will also reflect information inherent to his family 
and even his society. It can therefore not be a matter of sole ownership; it must be regarded 
as information in the public domain as it is a reflection of the genetic information of 
humankind, society, family and ultimately the individual.  
  
5.1 Humankind 
Humans share a large amount of genetic material. The Human Genome Project (National 
Human Genome Research Institute, n.d.) did not only quantify the genetic information, but 
also succeeded to identify some of the genetic differences amongst humans. The human 
genome consists of approximately 20 500 genes, of which 99% are common to all humans. 
The remaining 1% of our genome results in individual diversity through polymorphism, the 
difference in genetic material, which makes people different and unique. Although our 
phenotypes may be vastly different, our genotype shares a vast amount of genetic 
information. Are we as individuals the gatekeepers to our common genetic heritage and 
information, or does it belongs to Homo sapiens as species? 
By using the normal or wild-type DNA sequences as the norm or reference, we are able to 
identify abnormal genetic sequences and mutations as well as their association with disease, 
including cancers. This genetic information may be regarded as the equivalent of “open 
source” information technology; it resides in the public domain and is available for the 
benefit of the public at large.  
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An argument can therefore be made for the unrestricted bidirectional flow of genetic 
information to benefit all humans. In other words, if an individual suffers from a genetic 
disease and analysis of his genetic profile results in the identification of a specific genetic 
abnormality and mutational sequence, can he decline the dissemination of that information 
into the public domain? I believe not, especially as that information can be anonymised with 
no risk of invading his privacy. Whether he must be allowed to benefit materially for 
“supplying” that information, is another debate. Obviously, he stands to benefit just as 
much from additional information contributed by other patients to our understanding of 
disease. Our current understanding of the human genome and the information derived from 
it must remain readily available to the benefit of all humans.  
This raises another, and almost similar, issue. Patent rights are quite common in the medical 
industry, especially in pharmacology and in medical technology. Patent rights are also often 
regarded as one of the major cost drivers in healthcare. Nevertheless, at present this is one 
of the only ways how pharmaceutical companies and other research facilities can recoup 
their investment in research.   
However, can genetic information, and in particular that of the human genome, be 
patented? I believe that patent rights on natural occurring DNA sequences and other 
genetic information, even if it fulfils the legal requirements of a patent, cannot be ethically 
and morally justified. The Nuffield Council of Bioethics (2002) in its discussion paper on the 
patenting of DNA, highlighted the special status of our DNA. This special status is supported 
by different concepts like our genes as common heritage, the inalienable nature of our 
genes as well as our genes as public property. The importance of the common heritage 
concept in the argument against patenting of the human genome or portions thereof, is also 
emphasised by Ossorio (2007).  This view is also supported by Holtug (2012), stating 
“patents that would interfere with human autonomy or freedom would be quite dubious 
according to almost any moral view, whether they were issued on human genes, organs, or 
even on entire human beings.” He does not specify to whom specifically the concepts of 
autonomy or freedom apply, i.e. the individual harbouring the genetic abnormality 
(“owner”) or society who stands to benefit from the use thereof (“user”). For the latter 
group, restricted access governed by patent rights does limit someone’s freedom to obtain 
information, and the lack of that information may affect the quality of any decision-making 
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process and therefore the autonomy of the individual. Patenting our common heritage or 
parts thereof will deny others unrestricted access to their own genetic material.    
It also raises the question of ownership of patents on unique genetic sequences. Who has 
the right to patent it? The individual harbouring the sequence, or the institution performing 
the sequencing and identifying its significance? Can you patent part of someone else’s body 
and can an individual sell (even minute) bits of his body?  
The ownership of biological material has and will always be a contentious issue. Although 
any individual has a body, and by living through by means of that body, can also state he or 
she is a body, the concepts of “I have a body and I am a body” have limitations.  I cannot sell 
my body parts which are not renewed or replaced by the normal natural processes of life. 
That is not only against the law, but also contra bones mores, against the morals of society. 
Even remuneration for donating blood, a renewable body product, raises the ethical 
dilemma whether this would not attract donors, which are usually regarded as unfit for 
blood donations, like drug abusers. Adding a monetary value to a human product creates 
the potential for actions driven by greed and not altruism, allowing a drug addict for 
instance to “sell off” bits and pieces of their body to fund their habits.  The same applies to 
tissue processed in the routine as well as experimental medical settings; if a specific gene is 
identified, its individual genetic footprint is just part of the spectrum of genetic sequences 
or expressions determining health and disease, and not necessarily an event unique to that 
individual. The human genome has only so many ways (or sequences) to dictate health and 
disease.   
The ownership of genetic information, and in particular the validity of gene patents, was 
central in the recent American court case between the Association for Molecular Pathology 
and Myriad Genetics (Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics 2014). At 
issue was the patenting of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genetic sequences. These genetic 
sequences are used to diagnose individuals with a hereditary risk for inter alia breast and 
ovarian cancers. It has been widely used in clinical medicine throughout the world since 
1996. Initially there have been conflicting rulings in the District Court and the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the former ruling it “not patentable” and the higher court 
subsequently overturning that ruling. 
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In June 2013 the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that “a naturally occurring DNA 
segment is a product of nature and not patent eligible merely because it has been isolated, 
but cDNA14 is patent eligible because it is not naturally occurring” (Association for Molecular 
Pathology vs Myriad Genetics 2013, p.1).  This ruling is in line with my argument that most, 
if not all, genetic sequences, whether abnormal or normal, are common to all human beings 
and products of nature. It cannot be patented. However, any scientific technique or method 
to demonstrate these abnormal sequences and mutations, like the use of complimentary 
DNA as probes, can be patented.  
This important ruling therefore supports the special status of our naturally occurring DNA 
(and by inference our genome); although scientific techniques and methodologies may be 
patented, the genetic information must remain in the public domain.  
 
5.2 Society 
Man and his family do not live in isolation, but are part of a society, defined by culture, race, 
geography, etc. Societies often tend to share the same genetic pool. Often this sharing of 
genetic information is further accentuated by marriages between people of the same 
society. This undiluted gene pool created by inbreeding carries a risk for increased genetic 
abnormalities, including polygenetic and multifactorial diseases like hypercholesterolemia. 
These diseases are often well researched, sometime to the extent that the founder families 
who introduced the mutation can be identified. For instance, researchers at the University 
of Stellenbosch have recently identified a common founder couple, who came to the Cape 
in the 1650’s, for Parkinson’s disease amongst the Afrikaners in South Africa (Geldenhuys et. 
al. 2014).    
In some cases, details of the genetic information of a particular society may have a profound 
effect on their culture and their beliefs. This was the case with the Havasupia tribe of the 
Grand Canyon in the United States, where researchers of the University of Arizona 
conducted migration studies, without the necessary consent, on samples previously 
                                                          
14
 Complimentary DNA. 
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obtained for the study of medical conditions, like type II diabetes (American Indian and 
Alaska Natives Genetic Resource Centre, n.d.). These findings showed that their origin was 
not according to their belief and folklore of being placed by a big bird in the canyon and 
tasked to guard it, but rather that they migrated from Eurasia across the Bering Strait. They 
successfully sued the University of Arizona, for what was regarded as genetic piracy.   
Southern Africa, as the cradle of humankind, is a rich source of genetic information 
regarding the most primitive tribes and subsequent population migration. In the South 
African context, migration and population studies may even have an important socio-
political role to play, as these studies may be able to establish the rightful owners in land 
dispute claims.  
Who is the owner of this societal genetic information? The individual or the society? We 
know that certain societies may have unique genetic abnormalities. For instance, different 
genetic abnormalities exist in the BRCA1 gene, some of which are based on origin (including 
Afrikaner, Ashkenazi Jew, etc.). Knowledge of someone’s origin improves the changes of 
identifying a specific genetic mutation common to that particular society.   
Just as the genetic information encoded in the human genome belongs to humankind, the 
same principle of genetic information belonging to the public domain, applies to a society. 
However, societies have to be involved in influencing genetic research. Consent by a 
community or society is important, especially if information obtained from genetic research 
my affect their beliefs and culture.    
 
5.3 Family 
Shickle (1998) raises the question how the family unit must be defined. Should the 
definition of the genetic family only be limited to the nuclear family, and if not, how shall 
the boundaries of the extended family be defined? If only blood relatives are members of 
the genetic family, what about the interests of relatives by marriage, like the spouse of the 
patient? Although not genetically linked, these individuals may have to carry not only the 
financial and emotional burden of the disease, but may also have to care for at-risk 
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individuals, like children. Do they have any say in the dissemination of genetic information, 
especially after the death of the index patient? For instance, do they have the right to block 
the dissemination of such information to other members of the index patient’s genetic 
family?   
Parker (2012) makes a distinction between the different concepts of the family as 
represented in the family tree or pedigree: the “family as biology”, the “family as culture” 
and the “family as part of multiple families”. Amongst this, the “patient in the families” is to 
be found. 
The family as biology and the family as culture do overlap, but are not necessarily identical. 
The family as biology represents those individuals sharing the same pool of genetic 
information and they are all genetically linked, either vertically or horizontally. The family as 
culture also includes those members who are not genetically linked, like spouses. Numerous 
factors, like separation of family members, divorce and adoption may disrupt the cultural 
family, although the genetic linkage and therefore the family as biology will remain.  
Lack of consistency between these two concepts of the family, may affect the ability to 
address a possible genetic risk in a family. Family feuds may limit communication amongst 
family members. Withholding important genetic information may even be used as a way to 
punish others. As noted above, a spouse, being part of the family as culture, may refuse to 
divulge confidential information to the genetic or biological family of a deceased spouse. In 
the family as biology, identical twins by having identical genetic material, have the unique 
situation where the genetic testing of one individual will also reflect the status of the other, 
so-called testing by proxy. This may disclose information, which may be unwanted by the 
other party, and subsequently result in an invasion of privacy.     
The concept of the family as multiple families may arise in cases of unattributed paternity or 
paternal discrepancy, where genetic testing reveals that a specific individual has been 
fathered by someone other than the man believed to be the father. Bellis et al. (2005) in a 
review of published data from across the world, reported an incidence of paternal 
discrepancy which varies between 0.8% to as high as 30%. Theoretically there is also always 
a risk, albeit negligible, of babies being swopped at birth. Adoption and the use of donor 
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spermatozoa or ova also enlarge the gene pool of a particular family, creating families 
within families. 
The importance of knowing that your family harbours a specific genetic abnormality extends 
beyond ethics; it has tremendous scientific value. The limitations of certain genetic tests 
combined with the nature of many disease-causing mutations, may manifest itself in two 
ways (Parker 2012, p.24). The mutation may be unique to the family, very rare or not well 
researched. Details of this specific mutation will assist in further genetic testing of the at-risk 
family members, as it would be known which abnormality to test for. Secondly, some 
relatively common diseases, like breast cancer, are caused by any of a large number of 
different mutations. Some of these may be common, well researched, and can be readily 
tested for. Others may be rare with no genetic tests available, unless the specific mutation is 
known. The importance of having this technical genetic information available, is that a 
potential false “negative” result based on an analysis of only the more common and known 
mutations, may be prevented.     
There are many stakeholders in an individual’s genetic material, and by disseminating that 
information amongst others has important biological and scientific significance at all levels 
of interpersonal interactions, i.e. humankind, society and family. Different motives may 
drive individuals to share that information with others. It may be from a purely scientific and 
unemotional perspective where the individual wants to contribute to the promotion of 
science, or someone may be altruistic and socially compelled to do so.  Having said that, 
some individuals may view their genetic information as of a highly personal and sensitive 
nature, and will not allow it to be disclosed to anyone.  
Families often tend to consult the same healthcare practitioner. He therefore has a 
professional relationship with both the index patient as well as the children and even other 
family members. How does he manage this dual responsibility? In some cases, like the 
United Kingdom, the genetic services often cut across different hospitals, with the data kept 
in a regional or even central facility. A genetic counsellor may identify an at-risk family 
based on this information. What is the responsibility towards the family members consulting 
such a service for genetic counselling for a particular condition, while the genetic counsellor 
is aware of other important genetic information of which the patient may be unaware? I 
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believe that the scope of a genetic consultation is such that information provided by the 
health care practitioner cannot be limited to one specific condition, but must be 
comprehensive and inclusive of all possible genetic abnormalities. The question the patient 
is asking, is “do I suffer from a genetic abnormality”, rather than “do I suffer from this or 
that genetic abnormality”. A fair question deserves a fair answer.    
Finally, the cloud of confidentiality and privacy also extends to all members of a family 
known to suffer from a hereditary cancer syndrome or other genetic abnormality. In other 
words, the family as a group has a communal right to manage the dissemination of genetic 
information related to them, and whether they want to disclose this information to others.       
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6 Ethical issues in genetic testing 
6.1 Consent 
Consent plays a pivotal role in genetic testing, not only for the performance of the tests, but 
also regarding divulging confidential information to third parties. Consent and 
confidentiality are both supported by the principle of respect for autonomy, one of the four 
principles of biomedical ethics. It takes centre stage in the doctor-patient relationship. In 
the past, it was often disregarded and even ignored in line with the general attitude of 
paternalism and “the doctor knows best” approach. We have moved from this “doctor-
orientated” approach to a “patient-orientated” approach. In modern medical practice, the 
patient is an important role-player in the decision-making process. However, it is also 
important to remember that “the duty of respect for autonomy has a correlative right to 
choose, but there is no correlative duty to choose” (Beauchamp and Childress 2013, p.108) 
The principle of consent in genetic testing raises a number of issues. At the most basic level, 
that of an individual as a member of the family as biology, at least four different situations 
may exist: 
1) consent by the index patient for genetic testing; 
2) consent by the index patient for the confidential information to be divulged to 
at-risk individuals; 
3) consent by the at-risk family member to receive the information regarding a 
possible hereditary genetic abnormality; and  
4) consent by the at-risk family member to be tested.  
There are therefore a number of related and interdependent actions, which will determine 
the flow of the confidential genetic information amongst family members. For instance, we 
need the consent of the index patient to breach confidentiality, but unless we have the 
consent to invade the privacy of the other at-risk family member (recipient of the 
information), that information remains useless to the family. If an at-risk family member not 
only refuses to be informed of a possible genetic risk, but also fails to pass this information 
onto other members of that particular branch of the family tree, like children, these 
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individuals are deprived from important knowledge which may influence their reproductive 
choices, etc. At the same time, if they were to learn about the genetic abnormality and 
decide to undergo genetic testing, a positive test in one of the children will indirectly reveal 
that the parent, who had preferred to remain ignorant of his or her status, most probably  
also harbours the genetic abnormality. This results in a situation of testing by proxy.  
Beauchamp and Childress (2013, p.124) identify the following elements of informed 
consent. 
I. Threshold elements or preconditions 
1. Competence (to understand and decide) 
2. Voluntariness (in deciding) 
II. Information elements 
3. Disclosure (of material information) 
4. Recommendations (of a plan) 
5. Understanding (of 3 and 4) 
III. Consent elements 
6. Decision (in favour of a plan) 
7. Authorisation (of the chosen plan). 
Autonomy and competency, although different in meaning, with the former based on an 
individual’s right to self-governance and the latter emphasising that individual’s ability to 
execute a particular task or tasks, are both based on a very similar set of criteria. The 
concept of competency from a medical perspective, can be viewed from two different 
aspects, i.e. legally and ethically. The age when an individual is regarded to be competent in 
the eyes of the law to consent to a procedure, is arbitrarily defined and is not necessarily 
always the same, depending on the type of situation or intended treatment. Section 129 of 
the Children’s Act (2005) stipulate three different ages: above 12 years for surgical 
procedures, but with the parent’s15 consent; 12 years for medical procedures and without 
the parent’s consent; and below 12 years for HIV testing and without the parent’s consent. 
However, in all three scenarios there is an important prerequisite, i.e. “the child is of 
                                                          
15
 The Act also allows other individuals who act as care-givers to fulfil this legal duty depending on the type of 
situation.  
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sufficient maturity and has the mental capacity to understand the benefits, risks, social and 
other implications of the treatment/test.” It is therefore obvious that even this legal 
definition of competence to give consent, still requires some clarification of the concepts of 
maturity and sufficient mental capacity. According to Beauchamp and Childress (2013, 
p.116) “patients and prospective subjects are competent  to make a decision if they have the 
capacity to understand the material information, to make a judgment about this information 
in light of their values, to intend a certain outcome, and to communicate freely their wishes 
to caregivers or investigators.” 
Voluntariness can be explained with reference to when an individual consents to the action 
on his own intent, and not under the influence of another individual, society, religion or 
condition. Having said that, it is very seldom that any individual will not seek and take into 
account the opinion of other individuals, whether family or friends, in making a decision on 
any treatment. However, as long as that decision is based on a substantial amount of 
voluntariness, it can be regarded as a substantial autonomous decision. In addition, the 
individual may exercise his/her autonomy to appoint another individual or institution as a 
legitimate source of direction and decision-making (Beauchamp and Childress 2013, p.105).  
Although coercion of any kind to influence a patient’s decision has no ethical justification at 
all, even more subtle ways like persuasion and manipulation may erode a patient’s ability to 
act voluntary. When consulting with a patient on a molecular diagnostic matter, it is 
important to avoid informational manipulation by presenting all relevant information in an 
objective, and easy to understand, manner. Genetic information is often of a highly technical 
nature, and may be difficult for a layperson to understand. When disclosing this technical 
information it must therefore be in a language, which the patient can easily understand. 
Genetic counsellors will usually follow a non-directive approach when recommending a 
plan. Medical practitioners will tend to use a similar approach than in their routine clinical 
practice; in other words if they tend to be more directive when normally obtaining consent 
in general from a patient, it is very likely they will follow the same approach when obtaining 
consent for genetic testing.   
The disclosure of relevant information is an important element in obtaining informed 
consent (Beauchamp and Childress 2013, p.125). Different standards of disclosure have 
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been defined, with each one of these standards reflecting what is regarded as important 
information from different perspectives – i.e. a professional practice standard, a reasonable 
person standard, and finally, a subjective standard. 
It is important to follow the reasonable person standard in disclosing the information, which 
would be regarded as pertinent or material by a reasonable person, based on the 
significance he or she would attach to it. In genetic counselling, we often need to 
incorporate some elements of a subjective standard of disclosure.  By its nature, genetic 
information is not necessarily only about the patient, and disclosing how it may affect other 
at-risk family members with whom a special relationship may exist, may influence not only 
the patient’s understanding of the disease, but also any decisions.  This is very much in line 
with a family-centred model of autonomy “focussing on an individual’s web of relationships 
and the harmonious functioning of the family” (Beauchamp and Childress 2013, p.109). 
The basic informational elements of informed consent for cancer susceptibility testing as 
defined by the American Society of Clinical Oncology (ASCO) (Robson et. al. 2010, p.897), 
and which can be regarded as the professional practice standard of disclosure, are the 
following: 
1. Information on the specific genetic mutation(s) or genomic variant(s) being 
tested, including whether the range of risk associated with the variant will 
impact medical care; 
2. Implications of a positive and negative result; 
3. Possibility that the test will not be informative; 
4. Options for risk estimation without genomic or genetic testing; 
5. Risk of passing a genetic variant to children; 
6. Technical accuracy of the test including, where required by law, licensure of the 
testing laboratory; 
7. Fees involved in testing and counselling and for DTC (direct to consumer) 
testing, whether the counsellor is employed by the testing company; 
8. Psychological implications of test results (benefits and risks); 
9. Risks and protections against genetic discrimination by employers and insurers; 
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10. Confidentiality issues, including, for DTC companies, policies related to privacy 
and data security; 
11. Possible use of DNA testing samples in future research; 
12. Options and limitations of medical surveillance and strategies for prevention 
after genetic and genomic testing; 
13. Importance of sharing genetic and genomic results with at-risk relatives so that 
they may benefit from this information; 
14. Plans for follow-up after testing.  
These guidelines, and specifically point 13 of the guidelines, underline the importance of 
addressing any issues regarding the future dissemination of the results to any other family 
members who might be at risk in advance, and at the time when consent for genetic testing 
is obtained.  
This implies that not only must consent be obtained to divulge any information of relevance 
to at-risk family members, but also the mechanism for how this will be achieved, needs to 
be discussed. This will include the role of the genetic counsellor or practitioner in possibly 
providing a referral letter regarding the genetic condition to family members. Such a referral 
letter dealing in lay terms with the condition, its risks and further management will not only 
assist family members, but will also ensure that the correct medical information is 
disseminated and will create a portal of entry for patients as well as their own practitioners 
if they want to source further information. This is extremely important from a scientific 
point of view, as knowledge of the specific mutation not only improves the accuracy of 
diagnosis of a genetic abnormality in other family members, but is also a much more cost-
effective way of testing.  
 
 Refusal to consent to genetic testing 6.1.1
If a patient is competent and capable to give consent, he or she obviously has the right to 
withhold consent for genetic testing. This may result in the loss of the opportunity to detect 
a possible genetic abnormality. In practice, the clinician may have a strong suspicion of a 
possible hereditary genetic abnormality and share his concerns with the patient, but even 
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after counselling and having been informed of the potential risk to himself and his family, 
the patient may still refuse genetic testing.  
The dilemma now arises whether the family can be informed about this potential, but still 
unconfirmed, risk. The first issue which needs clarification, is whether this information can 
be divulged without the consent of the patient, and even maybe against his express wishes. 
The management of this type of refusal is central to the thesis and discussed in more detail 
later.  
 
The second issue is whether it is ethical to invade the privacy of the other family members 
with the unsolicited information about a potential, but still undiagnosed and unconfirmed, 
risk. How much “risk” is required to justify this breach of confidentiality and invasion of 
privacy?  Although the guidelines published by the American Society of Human Genetics 
(ASHG 1998, p.474) are specifically aimed at the scenario where consent for the 
dissemination of information is denied, it does provide some assistance in this related 
scenario.  The seriousness and foreseeability of the (potential) genetic condition, as well as 
the available measures to prevent the manifestation of the genetic risk, all need to be taken 
into consideration when deciding whether the information must be divulged. If there is a 
serious risk that one or more of the family members may harbour the hereditary genetic 
abnormality and effective surveillance measures are readily available to prevent the 
development of a malignant tumour, I believe the healthcare worker has an ethical duty to 
inform the potential at-risk family members. 
 
If a histopathology specimen is available, which is usually the case after most operations, 
the question arises whether this specimen can be genetically analysed without the consent 
of the index patient. Not only will it confirm the presence of a genetic abnormality, but 
depending on the type of genetic abnormality, also the potential hereditary risk. At present 
the consent procedure, or rather the lack thereof, for the histopathology examination of 
tissue specimens does not include any genetic analysis of the tissue. Even though no new 
tissue or blood sample has to be collected from the patient for these further tests, it will still 
be regarded as an invasion of someone’s privacy if genetic analysis is performed without the 
necessary consent.  
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Therefore, what is an alternative, albeit controversial, approach to promote the free flow of 
genetic information amongst family members in this stalemate situation? If it is accepted 
that consent to genetic testing is included in the original consent obtained for the 
performance of the operation and the histopathology examination of the tumour as argued 
in chapter 9, then obviously we will have a situation where genetic testing will automatically 
proceed if indicated. If no genetic abnormality is identified, this “negative” result also needs 
to be conveyed to the patient, and he must be advised to inform his family that there is no 
genetic abnormality or risk present. Not only will it assist the family psychologically in 
dealing with the possible fear of suffering the same fate, but it will also have potential 
financial implications when applying for insurance, etc.  
Consent specifically related to the histopathology examination of a tissue specimen, and  
including all genotype and phenotype aspects of a malignant tumour, will facilitate the 
comprehensive analysis of the tissue specimen. This will include not only a tissue diagnosis 
of the type of tumour, but also whether it has a genetic association. However, the 
implementation of such an all-inclusive and comprehensive approach depends on the 
acceptance of a unified concept of the genotype and phenotype. 
 
6.2 Confidentiality  
Refusal to consent to the dissemination of genetic information to at-risk family members is 
a central aspect of this thesis. The main issue is whether confidentiality is absolute, or 
whether it can be breached in specific situations.  
This debate can be opened with a to the point question: what is the point of an individual  
undergoing genetic testing, if the information obtained is not going to be appropriately 
used? The index patient has already contracted a tumour, and although some genetic 
syndromes may harbour a risk for more than one type of tumour, the “genetic damage” has 
already occurred. Why will you undergo genetic testing if the purpose is not to use this 
information to assist others? 
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The main benefits reside in the opportunity to inform (warn) the family members of a 
potential genetic threat and to give them the opportunity to prevent the development of 
disease (by undergoing prophylactic surgery), to limit the effect of disease (with regular 
screening to diagnose tumours in an early and resectable state), or to assist in reproductive 
choices. The right to confidentiality by the index patient therefore needs to be viewed 
against the right to beneficence and non-maleficence by the at-risk family members.  
 
 The prima facie duties of beneficence and non-maleficence 6.2.1
Do at-risk family members have a right to expect to be informed about possible genetic 
abnormalities, which may cause hereditary diseases? I use the phrase “right to expect to be 
informed”, rather than “right to know”, as the former places a stronger obligation on the 
index patient, and also on his health care practitioner. In practice therefore, may a health 
care practitioner override the refusal by his patient to divulge this information? 
I indeed believe so. The at-risk family, even though they may have no contract with the 
patient’s healthcare practitioner, may have a claim “to be rescued” under the principles of 
both non-maleficence and beneficence. Beauchamp and Childress (2013, p. 204) define 
some general examples of moral rules of obligation supported by the principle of 
beneficence:  
1. Protect and defend the rights of others. 
2. Prevent harm from occurring to others. 
3. Remove conditions that will cause harm to others. 
4. Help persons with disabilities. 
5. Rescue persons in danger. 
Based on this the at-risk family members qualify in terms of at least four of these criteria or 
recommendations when applied to this scenario. These recommendations can be grouped 
into two major groups: 
1. Everyone has the right to live a healthy life (although their habits and lifestyle may 
not always reflect their own duty and responsibility!). Information regarding a 
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hereditary cancer syndrome will promote someone’s health by the institution of 
preventive and surveillance measures. 
2. There is an obligation not only to prevent harm, but also to remove conditions that 
will cause harm to others. In this situation the biggest threat and danger to the at-
risk family member is to be ignorant and unaware of a hereditary cancer syndrome. 
Knowledge of such a condition is not only hugely beneficial from a health 
perspective, but it is also an expression of respect for the autonomy of the 
individual, enabling the at-risk family member to make an informed decision on how 
to manage the health risk. 
Both specific beneficence and general beneficence apply in dealing with genetic information 
regarding a hereditary cancer syndrome. Specific beneficence is directed at a specific party, 
in this case the patient (index patient) and it is obligatory to inform the individual of all risks 
attached to harbouring the abnormal gene. This will include specific therapy, like 
surveillance for the development of metachronous tumours, which may develop at a later 
stage and in other organ systems. In addition, the index patient has to be informed of the 
risk for other family members, specifically siblings and children, to potentiality carry this 
same genetic trait. In practice, families tend to consult the same medical practitioner. What 
is the responsibility of the medical practitioner to the other family members who also 
happen to be his patients? I believe they are also in a position to expect specific 
beneficence.  
Those family members who are not themselves patients of the medical practitioner, may 
still claim general beneficence, although it may be argued that it is of a non-obligatory 
nature.  
We often believe that rescue situations only exist in acute life-threatening situations, like 
drowning. Some life-threatening situations may be of a more chronic and insidious nature. 
Suffering from an unknown hereditary cancer syndrome serves as such an example. With 
very little, if any, sacrifice from their side, the index patient and his doctor may “save” an at-
risk individual by informing that individual of a possible genetic risk and the importance to 
be tested. As stated above, families often consult the same health care practitioner. 
Knowledge of a possible hereditary abnormality identified in another family member, 
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empowers that health care practitioner with potentially life-saving information. The only 
argument not to divulge this information is that the autonomy of the index patient must be 
respected and that privacy and confidentiality must therefore be maintained. If the index 
patient has refused to divulge this information to others, even after having been counselled 
on the potential benefits to his other family members, is the health care practitioner 
sacrificing any professional commitment if he then continues to inform at-risk family 
members? I do not believe so, and will argue that there is indeed a professional, legal and 
moral duty to inform the at-risk family members.    
The amount of sacrifice expected from the index patient, can be illustrated by our 
obligations in rescue situations as discussed by Beauchamp and Childress (2013, p.206):  
Apart from very close moral relationships, such as contracts or the ties of family and 
friendship, we suggest that a person X has a determinate obligation of beneficence 
toward a person Y if and only if each of the following conditions are satisfied: 
1. Y is at risk of significant loss of or damage to life, health or some other major 
interest. 
2. X’s action is necessary (singly or in concert with others) to prevent this loss or 
damage. 
3. X’s action (singly or in concert with others) has a very high probability of preventing 
it. 
4. X’s action would not present very significant costs, risks, or burdens to X. 
5. The benefit that Y can be expected to gain outweighs any harms, costs, or burdens 
that X is likely to incur. 
It is difficult to quantify the very important, but abstract, fourth criterion of “very significant 
risks, costs or burdens”, as it will determine in the end whether an act of rescue is obligatory 
or not. Nevertheless, the guidance from this set of criteria is quite clear. First, the index 
patient has a moral duty to inform (and rescue) his at-risk family members. Secondly, failing 
this, the healthcare practitioner then has the duty to inform the index patient that he (the 
health care practitioner) will have to divulge the necessary information.  
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6.3 Privacy 
All individuals have a right to privacy, and must be allowed to control access to different 
aspects of what is unique to that particular individual. This may include someone’s personal 
space (physical and locational privacy) or relationships (relational or associational privacy) 
(Beauchamp and Childress 2013). Three other types of privacy are applicable to genetic 
information: 
a) Informational privacy, as encoded in someone’s genome and the information that 
can be deduced from these sequences. 
b) Propriety privacy, as reflected by the ownership of your unique genetic code and 
its information.  
c) Decisional privacy, allowing you to make personal choices, including whether you 
want to be informed of possible genetic risks in your family. 
Both the privacy of the index patient and at-risk family members may be invaded. The 
privacy of the index patient may be invaded due to unsolicited access to the database of a 
genetic service or laboratory. In the era of cloud-based information technology and 
computer hackers, this is a real risk and needs to be managed by laboratories.  
 
 Privacy of at-risk family members 6.3.1
Informing someone about a hereditary cancer syndrome, may also be regarded as an 
invasion of their privacy if that information was not specifically asked for. Not everyone 
wants to know about genetic risks they may harbour. These individuals prefer to take their 
risks as life pans out. Some individuals may not wish to be informed of their familial 
hereditary risk at all, whilst others may want to know about these risks in their families, 
although they may eventually still decide not to undergo predictive testing themselves. 
There may be a number of psychological and emotional reasons for this decision, which may 
differ from person to person. Some of these, like fear of discrimination and stigmatisation, 
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will be discussed below. Ignorance of the possible risk to contract a disease may also be 
preferred in the case of some genetic diseases. If no therapeutic measures exist to reduce 
the risk or prevent the development of cancer or any other disease, does this knowledge 
really contribute to the quality of life and emotional well-being of an individual?  This will 
differ from patient to patient. Having to cope with the impending doom of a disease still 
lying beyond the clinical horizon, places a substantial emotional burden on any individual 
and his family. Some patients prefer to follow this route of genetic ignorance and deal with 
their life as it pans out. Other individuals may prefer to be informed of any genetic risk, 
especially as it may influence their reproductive decisions and life planning. 
The availability of a genetic test does not necessarily translate into widespread predictive 
testing by all those who may have a family history of neoplastic and non-neoplastic disease 
syndromes, like BRCA1 mutation and Huntington’s disease respectively. Lerman et. al. (1997, 
p.414) found in their study of 149 high-risk individuals for BRCA1 mutations, that only “58% 
of study participants requested BRCA1 test results, and 42% declined to learn their genetic 
status”. This reflects the significance of psychological, and specific cancer-specific, distress 
experience by many individuals. It is therefore important to realise that there are a 
significant number of individuals who do not want to know their genetic status or risks. 
Although this study dealt with individuals already informed of their risk, one may apply the 
same principles to the argument that many individuals might not want to know of any 
possible hereditary diseases running in his or her family. By divulging “unwanted” or 
“uncalled” information to an individual may result in a maleficent rather than a beneficent 
action due to the invasion of an individuals’ privacy. 
It is also possible to invade someone’s “genetic” privacy by testing someone else whose 
result then indirectly reflects the status of the other individual. Testing by proxy, either 
vertical (child-parent) or horisontal (sibling, especially twins), may sometimes indirectly 
reveal the genetic status of another individual who prefers to remain genetically naïve. 
Similarly, an at-risk family member may even feel that their privacy is invaded, when 
contacted to be informed that a genetic abnormality has been identified in a family member. 
Is this invasion of privacy acceptable? It is difficult to pre-empt in advance what the decision 
or reaction of a particular individual will be when confronted with one of the above 
situations. Obviously, if the individual prefers not to be informed, this decision must be 
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respected. This action leads to another ethical dilemma; what about the dissemination of 
that information to the children of this person? Not only may it influence their own health 
management, but it may also influence their reproductive choices. This situation may be 
prevented if all family members at risk are informed separately, giving each the opportunity 
to make their own decisions. Again, it does not solve the whole problem. It creates another 
possible scenario of testing by proxy (if one of the children tests positive, it may reflect the 
status of the parent). 
Three possible scenarios may unfold if someone with children is informed that his sibling 
has been diagnosed with a hereditary cancer syndrome. Hopefully the parent (the sibling of 
the index patient) will consent to genetic testing and depending on the result, disseminate 
that information to enable other at-risk family members to be counselled and tested. In the 
second scenario, the parent can decide that although he will inform his children of the 
potential risk and allow them to be tested, he himself will not undergo genetic testing. 
Testing his offspring may (indirectly) reveal the genetic status of the parent, because its 
presence in one of the children will imply that he must carry that same genetic abnormality 
– so-called testing by proxy. In the final scenario, the parent refuses not only his own 
genetic testing, but also refuses to pass the information on to his children. This important 
information is therefore loss to that particular branch of the family 
 
6.4 Summary 
It is obvious that informed consent not only plays a central role, but also the single most 
important role in the management of genetic information.  It involves different aspects and 
covers a whole spectrum, ranging from consent for genetic testing to consent for divulging 
genetic information as well as consent to invade someone’s privacy. Hopefully, in the ideal 
world, consent will always be granted, allowing all these actions to occur and thus facilitate 
the free-flow of important and potentially lifesaving information.  
Refusal of consent, however, highlights the uniqueness of hereditary diseases, including 
cancer syndromes. In routine medical practice we apply the principles of respect for 
autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and justice while focussing on a specific individual 
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– our patient. Our prima facie and actual duties are determined solely by the interest of that 
individual and his particular circumstances. 
In genetic practice we are no longer dealing with only one individual, nor the masses 
catered for by public health policies. Similar to a HIV-infected individual refusing to inform 
his sexual partner, we do have an obligation to other at-risk family members. Our ethical 
and moral responsibilities to different individuals linked together through close 
interpersonal relationships, can be represented by a number of overlapping Venn diagrams. 
Each of these represents an at-risk family member and with each one of them expecting the 
same – respect for autonomy, beneficence and non-maleficence.  It is our duty as 
healthcare workers to solve any stalemate position due to a lack of consent, to generate the 
maximum benefit to all the involved individuals.  
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7 Refusal to disclose genetic information  
 
Before we discuss the main reasons behind the refusal by index patients to grant consent to 
disclose genetic information, it is important to define the extent of the problem. Although 
no specific statistics could be find, an article by Falk et. al. (2003) does provide some idea 
how often this dilemma may occur in clinical practice.  
 
7.1 Incidence of refusal to divulge information 
In a study conducted by Falk  et. al. (2003), 206 medical geneticists participated in a survey 
addressing the issue of refusal to inform at-risk family members. 60% of the 206 individuals 
whom participated had encountered patients who refused to notify at-risk relatives. The 
number of encounters varied: 45% of this group encountered refusal on 1-5 occasions, 38% 
on 6-15 occasions, while 11% of this group encountered it on more than 16 occasions. 
Reasons cited by patients for not being willing to notify their at-risk relatives include: 
“concern of insurance discrimination, concern of employment discrimination, concern of 
altering family dynamics, (and) estranged family relationships” (ibid., p.377). In a substantial 
number of the cases the medical geneticist was not aware of the patient’s reason. 
It appears that although patients may initially have reservations to divulge the information 
to at-risk relatives, only a very small number of them will persist with their refusal. The 
incidence of index patients refusing to pass on information to their at-risk relatives is 
therefore low; however, as with most ethical issues in medicine, the dilemma is not in the 
number of cases involved, but in what is right or wrong. The main reasons for refusal are 
based on fears for discrimination and stigmatisation, including by those family members 
who will directly benefit from the information.  
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7.2 Discrimination 
One of the major concerns in disclosing genetic information is the possibility that this 
information may be used to discriminate against individuals as far as employment prospects 
and insurability are concerned. In this regard, even the mere fact that someone (or one of 
his family members) had undergone genetic testing in the past, may result in the individual 
being penalised. This may occur even though the insurer may not know the result of the 
genetic testing, which may even be a negative result. I believe that just the fact that there 
has been a possibility of a genetic disease in a family, may be enough grounds for an 
insurance company to load the premium or to exclude certain conditions. 
It is important that any potential discrimination based on genetic status must be governed, 
if not prohibited, by legislation.  Although legislation exists in most first world countries to 
prohibit the use of genetic information as a basis for discrimination, it still does not provide 
absolute protection, as insurance companies circumvent this by using family histories to 
base their decisions about risk on. 
 
  South Africa 7.2.1
In South Africa, no specific legislation dealing with discrimination based on genetic testing 
exists, but a number of acts, like the Employment Equity Act (1998) and Medical Schemes 
Act (1998), do make indirect reference to genetic information and its potential 
discriminatory abuse as part of the management of medical information in general. In 
addition, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996) and other common law 
principles further support the right of a person not to be discriminated against. Section 9 of 
our Constitution deals with equality, and states inter alia that the State or another person 
may not unfairly discriminate against someone. The issue will be whether a higher insurance 
premium or other penalty, like exclusion of certain benefits, is deemed to be regarded as 
unfair discrimination.  
South Africa has very strict privacy laws in place; some of these laws have been 
promulgated, but not yet implemented. Section 14 of the Constitution and the common-law 
right to privacy include privacy of information; that is, the right to determine for oneself 
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how and to what extent information is communicated to others. Computer-based genetic 
registers are subject to the Promotion of Access to Information Act (2000). Although the 
recently promulgated Protection of Personal Information Act (2013) aims to protect 
personal information, section 32 creates some confusion. This section allows for the 
processing of personal information concerning inherited characteristics if a serious medical 
interest prevails. Although the aim of this section is most probably to allow the use of this 
information by medical practitioners and health care facilities, it does not exclude insurance 
companies, medical schemes and other institutions whose interest in someone’s genetic 
information may not share the same honest intentions. 
In a document published by the Sub-directorate Human Genetics of the National 
Department of Health (nd., p.50) section 9.1.6 states, “individual privacy should be 
protected from institutional third parties, such as employers, insurers, schools, commercial 
entities, and government agencies”.  Family members do not form part of this group of third 
parties; whether this is intentional or not, is not obvious, but it therefore does not legally 
and specifically prohibit the disclosure of information to family members. 
Which particular law other than the Constitution will take preference is a legal debate; from 
an ethical perspective the medical doctor must ensure that confidentiality is maintained at 
all times, unless authorised otherwise by the patient. Having said this, we must remember 
that confidentiality is not absolute, especially where other identifiable third parties may be 
at risk, as discussed elsewhere in this document. 
 
7.2.1.1 Employment 
Businesses are forced to operate cost-effective and efficient in a free market economy. 
Genetic screening of (potential) employees provides the employer with an opportunity to 
reduce the healthcare costs of the workforce. This may be justified when it seems to be to 
the benefit of the employees. An employer may for instance want to screen candidates, to 
exclude those susceptible to either occupational or non-occupational diseases (MacDonald 
and Williams-Jones 2002).  
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At the same time, it creates the risk to introduce eugenics in the workplace, as certain 
genetic traits may be regarded as more suitable for managerial and other senior positions in 
a company. This will create different class orders amongst the economically active 
workforce based on genetic disposition. At the same time, the State will have to carry the 
burden to support the “genetically unemployable” of society. 
The medical testing of employees and applicants for employment is prohibited by section 7 
of the Employment Equity Act (1998), unless “(a) legislation permits or requires the testing, 
or (b) it is justifiable in the light of medical facts, employment conditions, social policy, the 
fair distribution of employee benefits or the inherent requirements of the job”. According to 
this, genetic testing as part of the routine occupational health services may have a role to 
play if a specific genetic abnormality or trait may be an exclusion factor for employment.  
MacDonald and Williams-Jones (2002, p.238) suggest that if a number of criteria are met, it 
would be ethically permissible to offer workplace genetic testing. However, it cannot be 
compulsory. Some of these criteria include the use of only highly specific and sensitive 
genetic tests, testing for genes not associated with a historically disadvantaged group, as 
well as the guarantee of continued access to group insurance. Offering these services may 
be important to protect the welfare of the workforce.  Certain genes may increase 
susceptibility to environmental factors and toxins to be found in a particular workplace.  
These may include an increased risk to develop bladder cancer when individuals with a 
particular N-acetyltransferase phenotype are exposed to carcinogenic arylamines.   It is also 
suspected that certain genetic traits may increase the risk for serious brain injury and even 
Alzheimer’s disease in contact head injuries; this may affect the employment of professional 
sportsmen participating in contact sport. 
 
7.2.1.2 Insurance 
The insurance industry in South Africa consists of a whole spectrum of services, including life 
insurance as well as the medical aid industry or “health funders”. Insurers are by nature risk-
aversive. Actuaries constantly try to determine the risk associated with potential clients and 
diseases to be in a better-informed position to allocate premiums. Alternatively, some 
health conditions may be excluded from the list of benefits.  
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Kinsley (2009) addresses the use of genetic information by insurance companies in South 
Africa, and highlights the risk for genetic discrimination. This may create a “genetic 
underclass” or a group of “genetically impaired” individuals. The repercussions for these 
individuals with genetic predispositions to certain diseases are that they may not be granted 
health insurance at all, or may be charged higher premiums. It has to be borne in mind that 
the Medical Schemes Act (1998), provides that a registered medical aid scheme may not 
unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against its members based on their “state of 
health”. 
Insurers have argued that using genetic information to predict risks is nothing more radical 
than an extension of their current risk-assessment practices (Kinsley 2009). At present, 
insurers require applicants to not only provide detailed information regarding their own 
medical history and lifestyle, but also their family medical history. It appears that any 
information obtained from genetic tests forms part of the risk profile of the individual. 
The existence of certain single gene disorders can predict to some extent the risk for the 
development of a genetic disease or lowered life expectancy. However, factors like the 
penetrance and variance of the genetic abnormality also need to be taken into account. It is 
not always that obvious to what extent and accuracy a genetic test predicts the onset of the 
disease, and how to factor this information into any actuarial estimate. If the multi-factorial 
and polygenic nature of many diseases, as well as other factors, like penetrance, is not taken 
into account, it will predispose to discrimination in the insurance industry. Kinsley (ibid. 
p.92) believes that this situation may be somewhat avoided if genetic specialists assist the 
industry “in converting genetic information into a predictive risk for life insurance 
underwriting purposes”.  
Otherwise, the question will be asked whether the insurance industry has the ethical 
backbone to regulate the application of genetic information in a non-discriminatory manner, 
or whether it must be regulated by statute. 
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  Rest of the world 7.2.2
The United States of America have promulgated a couple of laws regulating the use of 
genetic information, including the Genetic Information Non-discrimination Act  (2008) 
(GINA) which protects against discrimination based on genetic information by the health 
industry and employers (Robson 2010, p.898). The main action points of this act are as 
follows: 
1. It prohibits health insurance carriers from: 
a. denying coverage because an individual took or refused to take a genetic test; 
b. denying coverage based on tests results; 
2. It prohibits employers from using this information as the basis for 
employment decisions.   
The Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information (Privacy Rule) 
promulgated under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (1996) and the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (1990) also protect genetic information and the abuse 
thereof for discriminatory purposes (Storm 2008). 
 
7.3 Stigmatisation 
Few other institutions are as feared as the court of public opinion. Although hereditable 
cancer syndromes, like any other dreaded disease, will most likely be viewed with empathy 
and compassion, genetic diseases may have a social stigma attached to it. This may be 
either due to the physical effects, like neurofibromatosis resulting in elephant-like features, 
or socio-behavioural manifestations, like Tourette syndrome.  
In the family context where a mutation has been transmitted to a child, the responsible 
parent may experience guilt, while the child may react with anger and even blame the 
parent for not fulfilling his parental responsibilities.  
Someone’s religious beliefs may also play a role in whether they would allow the 
dissemination of genetic information. If they believe it may result in the termination of 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
67 
 
affected pregnancies by other family members, they may be concerned of being stigmatised 
or ostracised by their religion if seen as indirectly promoting abortions. 
Withholding important genetic information from at-risk family members may also be used 
as an agent to punish other family members, especially in a dysfunctional family. 
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8 Legislation, professional guidelines and legal precedent 
on consent, confidentiality and the duty to disclose  
8.1 Legislation 
South Africa does not have legislation that deals specifically with the management of 
genetic information. However, some guidance can be found in statutes, like the National 
Health Act (2003). In addition, the professional guidelines published by the Health 
Professions Council of South Africa (which are in the process of being updated), are also of 
some assistance. Scenario’s, like deceased persons, individuals not competent or able to give 
consent, vulnerable groups, as well as research subjects, will not be discussed in detail 
although each has specific legal and/or ethical requirements. 
Section 6 of the National Health Act (2003) defines the extent of the information that has to 
be conveyed to the patient when obtaining informed consent: 
(1) Every health care provider must inform a user of-  
(a) the user’s health status except in circumstances where there is substantial 
evidence that the disclosure of the user’s health status would be contrary to the 
best interests of the user;  
(b) the range of diagnostic procedures and treatment options generally available 
to the user;  
(c) the benefits, risks, costs and consequences generally associated with each 
option; and  
(d) the user’s right to refuse health care. 
It may be argued that section 6(1)(c) places a legal obligation on the health care worker at 
the time of obtaining informed consent for genetic testing, to inform the patient that 
disseminating relevant information to at-risk family is seen as a consequence of genetic 
testing. 
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In the case of children, two sections of the Children’s Act (2005) are relevant. Section 9 
states that, “in all matters concerning the care, protection and well-being of a child, the 
standard that the child’s best interest is of paramount importance, must be applied.”  
Genetic testing can be regarded as “medical treatment”, and according to section 129(2): 
a child may consent to his or her own medical treatment or to the medical treatment 
of his or her child if -  
(a) the child is over the age of 12 years; and 
(b) the child is of sufficient maturity and has the mental capacity to understand the 
benefits, risks, social and other implications of the treatment. 
It is important that these two sections be read together, as there may be circumstances 
where it may not be to the benefit of a child to undergo genetic testing, for instance where 
that may determine whether the child is genetically suitable for adoption. In such a scenario 
section 9 of the aforementioned act, as well the constitutional rights of children will 
supervene. The same applies to genetic testing in children to identify adult-onset diseases.  
Finally, what is the position of minor children if their parents refuse to inform them of a 
hereditary cancer syndrome?  Fortunately, most inherited cancer syndromes only manifest 
in adulthood; it is therefore important to have a system in place to inform these children and 
have them tested when they are regarded legally capable to consent. An omission to inform 
the at-risk daughter of a patient who died from colon cancer as a result of familial polyposis 
formed the basis of the case, Safer versus Estate of Pack (discussed later).  As genetic testing 
is regarded as a medical and not surgical procedure, this can be done according to the 
Children’s Act (2005) when the child is twelve years and older and mentally competent. 
From a moral perspective, it is important to differentiate between diseases, which may 
already present or manifest in early adulthood and for which screening procedures need to 
be instituted during childhood, like familial adenomatosis polyposis which carries a high risk 
for the development of colon cancer, and those diseases which are of adult-onset. In the 
latter group, if no preventative or curative measures can be instituted, this knowledge may 
not be in the best interest of the child. Knowing that a particular child is harbouring a 
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specific genetic abnormality may influence the way he is seen as a member of the family, 
including investment in his future development, etc.  
The statutory position on confidentiality is addressed in section 14 of the National Health Act 
(2003), which states: 
(1) All information concerning a user, including information relating to his or her 
health status, treatment or stay in a health establishment, is confidential. 
(2) Subject to section 15 [governing access to health records], no person may 
disclose any information contemplated in subsection (1) unless- 
(a) the user consents to that disclosure in writing; 
(b) a court order or any law requires that disclosure; or 
(c) non-disclosure of the information represents a serious threat to public health. 
 
Section 14(2)(c) of the above act refers only to the disclosure of confidential information if a 
“serious threat to public health” exist. This will include the threat of communicable diseases, 
like tuberculosis. However, the individual (or any other grouping other than “public”, 
including family) is excluded from this definition. Therefore, it appears as if there is a 
statutory exclusion, which might even be interpreted as a prohibition, to inform individuals 
who may be at risk without the consent of the patient. Whether this position will be upheld 
in a court of law, especially taking other legislation like our Constitution into account, is 
doubtful. 
The only other South African legislative or governmental publication specifically addressing 
the issues of consent and confidentiality in genetic testing, appears to be a document 
published by the Sub-directorate Human Genetics (which forms part of the Maternal, Child, 
Women’s Health and Nutrition Cluster) of the National Department of Health (n.d., p.50). 
Section 9.1.5. states that “confidentiality of genetic information should be maintained 
except when there is a high risk of serious harm to family members at genetic risk and the 
information could be used to avert this harm.” In section 9.2., addressing the ethical 
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principles for genetic professionals, this is re-emphasised with terms like, “honour the 
confidentiality of information, shared in the relationship with patients and their families” 
and “urge patients and families to share genetic information, with relatives at risk, pointing 
out the possible need for this, early in the relationship”. This is reiterated in the summary on 
confidentiality, where the issue of reproductive choices is also brought into the quotation:  
In genetics, the true patient is a family with a shared genetic heritage. Family 
members have a moral obligation to share genetic information with each other. 
If children are intended, individuals should share information with their partners. 
 
8.2 Professional guidelines 
What is the position of professional bodies on the disclosure of familial genetic information 
without consent and against the wishes of the patient? It appears as if both the American 
and British views are the same and that confidentiality is not absolute. 
The American Society of Human Genetics (ASHG) (1998, p.474) has stated that:  “disclosure 
should be permissible where attempts to encourage disclosure on the part of the patient 
have failed; where the harm is likely to occur and is serious and foreseeable; where the at-
risk relative(s) is identifiable; and where either the disease is preventable/treatable or 
medically acceptable standards indicate that early monitoring will reduce the genetic risk.”  
However, I differ from the last requirement by the ASHG for the disclosure of genetic 
information. Obviously, some genetic diseases cannot be prevented and with no treatment 
options available may, or even will, cause disease. Huntington’s disease is an example of the 
latter.  Even in the case of Huntington’s disease, where there is not much to be done to 
change the natural course of the disease, knowledge of such information may still help the 
individual (and his family) to prepare for the illness. This may include the creation of a 
psychological support system for the family to deal with the looming illness, as well as long-
term financial planning. It may also affect the reproductive choices of other at-risk 
individuals. 
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The Joint Committee of the Royal College of Physicians, Royal College of Pathologists and 
the British Society for Human Genetics (2011, p.22) stipulates that the rule of confidentiality 
is not absolute, and that it may be justified in special circumstances to “break confidence 
where in doing so a serious harm can be avoided.” They suggest that as part of this process 
the patient needs to be informed that confidence will be breached and the information will 
be disclosed. Discussions with experienced professional colleagues and documentation of 
the reasons to breach confidentiality must form part of this process.     
It is interesting to note that there are countries, like Norway, Switzerland and France, where 
confidentiality is regarded as absolute, and where no information may be divulged against 
the wishes of a patient (American Society of Human Genetics 1998). 
Professional guidance in South Africa is provided by the guidelines published by the Health 
Professions Council of South Africa. Two sections are of relevance in this matter (Health 
Professions Council of South Africa, 2008b, p.11):  
17.1 Screening or testing of healthy or asymptomatic people to detect genetic 
predispositions or early signs of debilitating or life threatening conditions can be 
an important tool in providing effective care. However, the uncertainties involved 
in screening or testing may be great, for example the risk of false positive or false 
negative results. Some findings may potentially have serious medical, social or 
financial consequences not only for the individuals, but also for their relatives. In 
some cases, the fact of having been screened or tested may itself have serious 
implications. 
17.2 Health care practitioners must ensure that anyone considering whether to 
consent to screening or testing can make a properly informed decision. As far as 
possible, practitioners should ensure that screening or testing is not contrary to 
the individual's interests. Health care practitioners must pay particular attention 
to ensuring that the information the person wants or ought to have is identified 
and provided. Practitioners should be careful to explain clearly:  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
73 
 
17.2.1 The purpose of the screening or test; 
17.2.2 The likelihood of positive or negative findings and the possibility of false 
positive or negative results; 
17.2.3 The uncertainties and risks attached to the screening or testing process; 
17.2.4 Any significant medical, social or financial implications of screening or 
testing for the particular condition or predisposition; 
17.2.5 Follow up plans, including the availability of counselling and support 
services. 
It can be argued that although “any significant social implication” refers to the risk of 
stigmatisation and discrimination, it also includes the responsibility of the patient to inform 
others who may be at risk. As the information forms part of the counselling process to 
obtained informed consent, it places an ethical responsibility on the health care practitioner 
to inform the patient beforehand of the need to notify at-risk relatives. 
Although no particular reference is made regarding the concept of confidentiality when 
dealing with genetic information, the general principle that confidentiality is not absolute, is 
reflected in the following (Health Professions Council of South Africa, 2008a, p.6): 
8.2.4 Disclosures in the public interest:  
8.2.4.1 In cases where health care practitioners have considered all the available 
means of obtaining consent, but are satisfied that it is not practicable to do so, or 
that patients are not competent to give consent, or exceptionally, in cases where 
patients withhold consent, personal information may be disclosed in the public 
interest where the benefits to an individual or to society of the disclosure 
outweigh the public and the patient's interest in keeping the information 
confidential, (e.g. endangered third parties such as the spouse or partner of a 
patient who is HIV positive, who after counselling refuses to disclosure his or her 
status to such spouse or partner; or reporting a notifiable disease).  
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8.2.4.2 In all such cases the health care practitioner must weigh the possible 
harm (both to the patient and to the overall trust between practitioners and 
patients) against the benefits that are likely to arise from the release of 
information.  
8.2.4.3 Examples of circumstances to protect the patient or other persons from 
death or serious harm, include, but are not limited to:  
a. Access to prophylactic treatment for a person who has had contact with an 
infectious disease, or  
b. An employee with a health condition, which may render him or her unable to 
work safely posing a danger to co-workers or clients  
c. A driver of a vehicle who requires medication to control an illness that might 
impair his or her driving ability.  
 
8.3 Legal precedent 
No specific legal precedent or case law exists in South Africa regarding the legal obligation, if 
any, of a patient or health care practitioner to inform an at-risk relative of the findings of 
genetic analysis. In the United States, reference is usually made to three cases (American 
Society of Human Genetics Social Issues subcommittee on Familial Disclosure 1998; Harris 
2005; Schneider 2006; Storm 2008). 
The most well-known case in bio-ethics dealing with the conflict between the right of 
privacy and confidentiality of an individual versus the duty to warn an identified individual 
of a foreseeable and serious harm, is the case of Tarasoff versus Regents of the University of 
California. This case deals with the general duty to warn a third party of possible danger or 
harm, and is supported by the principles of beneficence and non-maleficence. Authors like 
Harris (2005) believes that this situation differs from a case when the risk is genetic, and not 
infectious or an instance of physical harm; in the former situation the patient does not 
directly pose a harm to the relative(s) as the mutation is already either absent or present in 
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the relatives. It is therefore more of a moral duty rather than a legal obligation to inform 
others. 
Two American cases addressing the legal duty to warn third party relatives of genetically 
inheritable diseases have divergent views. In Pate versus Threkel, the Florida Supreme Court 
ruled in 1995 “that a physician’s duty to warn about a cancer predisposition syndrome was 
satisfied by educating the patient about familial cancer risk” (Storm 2008 p.229).  In this 
case, dealing with a patient with medullary carcinoma of the thyroid, genetic risks were 
distinguished from infectious diseases or physical harm, in line with Harris’s argument. 
In 1996 the New Jersey Appellate Court in Safer versus Estate of Pack ruled that a medical 
practitioner has a broader duty to warn, and “that a physician’s duty to warn extends to 
identifiable third parties known to be at risk of avoidable harm from a genetically 
transmissible condition, and that physicians should take ‘reasonable steps’ to warn at-risk 
family members” (ibid.). This was a case of familial adenomatous polyposis, and in this 
matter the court found “’no essential difference’ between the type of genetic threat at issue 
in this case and ‘the menace of infection, contagion, or a threat of physical harm’”(ibid). 
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9 The justification for a comprehensive consent for the 
histopathology examination of specimens, which will 
facilitate the genetical analysis of tumours 
My first argument is that the current way in which clinicians obtain consent for an 
operation, is no longer adequate and needs to be supplemented with a comprehensive and 
all-inclusive consent for the histopathology examination of a specimen. At present, the 
consent process only focuses on the surgical procedure, and seldom takes any aspects 
surrounding the histopathology examination of the tissue specimen, including genetic 
analysis, into consideration. This creates the potential situation where the histopathologist 
may proceed with investigations without the consent of the patient, which although not 
necessarily diagnostic of a hereditary cancer syndrome, may identify those with a real risk to 
suffer from a genetic abnormality.  
The need for a comprehensive histopathology consent procedure is based on the following 
two arguments, with the conclusion of the first argument also serving as a premiss for the 
second argument. 
 
9.1 The argument supporting a unified concept of the genotype 
and phenotype 
Premiss: Pathology investigations exist today to determine a “mixture” of genotypic and 
phenotypic features at any point along the genotype – phenotype continuum of a tumour. 
Conclusion: The concepts of the genotype and phenotype of a tumour are no longer two 
separate entities, but have merged together from a scientific analytical perspective. 
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9.2 The argument supporting a comprehensive and all-inclusive 
consent for histopathology procedures 
Premiss 1: Patients have a right to respect for autonomy, and this requires that informed 
consent is obtained for any pathology investigation. 
Premiss 2: The concepts of the genotype and phenotype of a tumour are no longer two 
separate entities, but have merged together from a scientific analytical perspective. 
Conclusion:  Informed consent obtained for the histopathology examination of a tumour 
specimen must be comprehensive and all-inclusive of morphological and genetic testing. 
 
9.3 Implementation of a unified concept of the genotype and 
phenotype 
 As already stated, the consent process at present focuses primarily on the surgical 
procedure and the possible complications thereof; there is often only one paragraph on the 
consent form dealing with the “disposal” of tissue. The latter implies either the 
histopathology examination of the tissue specimen, or in the case of amputations, etc. the 
cremation or disposal otherwise of the tissue.  
Patients seldom, if at all, give specific and express consent for the histopathology 
procedures to be performed. This is highlighted by the fact that patients sometimes 
complain that the specimen was submitted for histopathology examination without their 
knowledge and permission, and they are now confronted with an (unexpected) pathology 
bill. 
I believe that specific, detailed and comprehensive consent for histopathology procedures 
may not only solve some of these “administrative” issues, but also more importantly, if 
properly obtained, will be of tremendous benefit to the patient from a medical and health 
perspective. This is required, as we have to accommodate the impact of modern science, 
and in particular molecular pathology and genetics, into the way we practise histopathology 
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and medicine in this modern era. The incorporation of all histology and non-histology 
information into an “integrated diagnosis” will soon form part of the next World Health 
Organization (WHO) classification of central nervous system tumours (Louis et. al. 2014).  In 
time, our ability to predict the risk to develop disease or malignancy will become part of 
everyday medical practice, and we must be careful not to end up in a stalemate position 
where bio-ethical issues prevent us from using this information to benefit humankind.  
Scientific and laboratory techniques, like immunohistochemistry, gene expression profiling, 
sequencing, etc. are all changing the concepts of phenotype and genotype. In addition, we 
also realise that other factors, like epigenetics, play an important role how the genotype will 
influence, rather than determine, the phenotype. If we accept that the phenotype and 
genotype are merging, then we must start to treat them like one concept, at least as far as 
consent is concerned. The pathology examination of any tumour must include all aspects of 
that tumour, i.e. the morphological features as well as somatic and germline genetic 
information, and the (potential) extent of the investigations must be conveyed to the 
patient when informed consent for the procedure or operation is obtained. 
If the genetic information of an individual no longer has “special standing” in medicine, but 
is merely seen as an integral component of the genotype-phenotype continuum, it may be 
argued that any consent obtained for the analysis of a specimen is all-inclusive. In practice, if 
a patient is operated on for colon cancer, consent for the analysis of the tumour specimen 
will therefore include any genetic analysis deemed necessary to determine inter alia: 1) the 
diagnosis and classification of the tumour, 2) identifying possible therapeutic opportunities 
(pharmacogenomics), and 3) any genetic abnormality which predisposed the individual to 
the development of the tumour. The latter is the controversial issue at stake, as it will 
extend genetic analysis beyond the identification of somatic mutations. It will also diagnose 
germ-line mutations, and therefore identify a family at risk.   
In the oncology setting, knowledge regarding an underlying genetic abnormality has definite 
benefits to the individual patient. Many of the hereditary cancer syndromes affect more 
than one organ system (see annexure A for a list of tumours associated with Lynch 
syndrome). By identifying a germline mutation, the index patient can be more thoroughly 
monitored and screened for the development of metachronous tumours in the colon or 
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other organ sites. These genetic tests are therefore at the time of diagnostic work-up for the 
sole benefit of the index patient. In neglecting to perform these tests, the histopathologist 
may not be fulfilling his professional duty to the patient.  
The opposite argument is that a staggered consent process needs to be followed. This 
approach will, however, not solve the fundamental problem of how far histopathology 
testing can proceed, before additional consent for genetic testing is required. In addition, as 
discussed earlier, there is a real risk that this fragmented approach may result in the loss of 
important information in the post-operative setting during the referral form one specialist 
to another, e.g. oncology. 
 
9.4 A proposed informed consent procedure for histopathology 
procedures 
I believe that all these problems can easily be addressed by widening the scope of the 
consent obtained at the time of surgery. This must be an all-inclusive and comprehensive 
consent at the time of the operation, which will enable the histopathologist to conduct a 
detailed histopathology analysis, and if indicated, genetic study of the submitted tissue 
specimen.  
The informed consent procedure at the time of surgery must be based on two separate 
consents to be obtained: 
1) Informed consent related to the surgical procedure, including the anaesthetic 
procedure and possible complications. At present, this is the standard procedure. 
2) Informed consent related to the histopathology examination of the tissue specimen. 
This must include not only consent for the morphological examination of the 
specimen, but also consent for further genetic testing of the specimen if deemed 
necessary. Although the patient must be given the option to indicate whether he 
would prefer a staggered process, i.e. consenting to any germ-line genetic testing 
only after being informed of, and counselled, on the need for these tests, there must 
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be no opt-out option. Throughout these procedures to obtain consent for 
histopathology and genetic testing, the potential need to divulge any beneficial 
information regarding genetic syndromes to at-risk family members must be 
emphasised.  At present consent is seldom obtained for any laboratory 
investigations, except HIV testing, and the patient usually will only give implied or 
tacit consent when told that the specimen will be sent to the laboratory for 
examination. As stated before, this standard of practice often also applies to clinical 
pathology specimens, like blood, and is not the ideal medical practice. 
This is the only way for all scientific information in a tissue specimen to be optimally 
harvested for the benefit of the patient, and (hopefully) the family. If the proposed 
histopathology classification system for central nervous system tumours (and soon other 
organ systems) is implemented in the near future, genetic information will become a 
requirement as part of the diagnosis. Our bio-ethical approach must be supportive of our 
evolving scientific concept of diseases.  This brings us to the next part of the discussion, 
specifically whether the family has any propriety or other rights to this genetic information. 
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10 Moral perspectives on the management of genetic 
information in hereditary cancer syndromes 
My second, and also my major, argument is that information regarding a possible hereditary 
cancer syndrome cannot be withheld from other at-risk family members on request of the 
index patient (or designated decision-maker). In fact, I would like to argue that the 
information does not even belong to the family as such, but to society and humankind at 
large. As long as the privacy of the family harbouring a specific genetic abnormality can be 
protected and confidentiality maintained, application of this scientific information to be of 
universal benefit, must be allowed.    
BRCA1 and BRCA2 genetic mutations in breast cancer serve as an appropriate example to 
illustrate the mutual benefits that can be reaped from the free and unhindered flow of 
genetic information amongst all levels – humankind, society, family and the individual. On a 
global level, the pooling of genetic information in patients suffering from breast cancer has 
enabled us to identify the most common mutations affecting humankind. It was also noted 
that certain social groups, like the Afrikaner group in South Africa, are more prone to 
harbour specific mutations. This emphasises the importance of societies sharing a common 
genetic heritage. Finally, certain families may have genetic mutations unique to that family 
and which may therefore be relatively rare. These mutations may not necessarily be 
diagnosed if the specimen is subjected to routine genetic testing. If the exact nature of the 
mutation is known, specific analysis of that genetic sequence can be performed, which will 
not only increase the sensitivity of the analysis, but will also be at a much lower cost to the 
patient.  
 
10.1 Introduction 
The two main moral and ethical issues central to the discourse regarding ownership of 
genetic information are confidentiality and privacy. These two issues form the crux of the 
matter.  
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In the modern world, our perception and definition of privacy is constantly changing. Some 
of these may be as a result of new technology, like the tracking facility on mobile phones 
which enables us to digitally explore services and places in our geographical and spatial 
vicinity. In exchange for security, we may also allow an invasion of our privacy by 
surveillance equipment.  The above invasion of our privacy is tolerated and consented to on 
condition that we receive some benefit in exchange: information, security, etc. At the same 
time, we are also experiencing a cultural change that is referred to by Chadwick et. al. 
(2014, p.13) as the “new exhibitionism”, driven by the proliferation of social media. We are 
more and more willing to voluntarily lower the fences surrounding our private lifes on 
websites like Facebook, even entering into intimate digital relationships with individuals we 
have had very little, and sometimes even no, physical contact with. This is all happening 
with our consent, usually with the click of a mouse or a tap on the screen, and without us 
always really understanding the extent and implications of what we are consenting to. One 
may thus argue that even though we are consenting to all these applications and social 
websites, we are often ill informed and oblivious to the potential threat this may have on 
our personal lifes.  
With this often public flow of personal information amongst “contacts”, one would assume 
that individuals would also be more readily sharing information regarding their medical, 
including their genetic, status. However, it appears as if individuals are not only maintaining 
the status quo in the management of medical information, but that the awareness of bio-
ethical rights and duties has subjected the governance of information of such a nature to 
even stricter rules.  Initiatives, like biobanking, have also brought new challenges to privacy 
and data protection, especially in view of the globalisation of medical information.  
Man, most probably as part of a primitive survival trait, has always been an “opportunistic 
animal”. If the release of certain information may have positive spin-offs, like sympathy, 
security or social popularity, we are often more than willing to share it. At the same time, 
we still want to control the type and amount of information we divulge to others. We tend 
to protect any information that we believe may harm us. This may differ from individual to 
individual, and it is also influenced by our culture and society. In this modern age, we all 
strive to project that perfect image - physically, emotionally and professionally. We are well 
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aware that society usually does not deal favourably or sympathetically with the losers of 
life’s lotteries.  
In the genetic context, this potential harm may include discrimination by employers and 
insurers, stigmatisation by society and even family members, and ultimately social 
exclusion, rejection and expulsion. To prevent this, we often adopt an exclusive position to 
protect “negative” medical information, like HIV status and hereditary genetic information, 
from society.  However, there are many who choose to publish their genetic data in the 
public domain. Chadwick et. al. (2014, p.57) refer to two websites creating a virtual forum 
for patients, i.e. patientslikeme.com and quantified self. 
Although professional guidelines, including the best medical practice guidelines, and legal 
precedent exist and have already been discussed elsewhere, we still need to reflect on the 
moral and ethical position related to the ownership of genetic information.  
Like with any other bio-ethical dilemma in medicine, the issue of ownership of genetic 
information about hereditary cancer syndromes can be viewed from the perspective of 
different moral and ethical theories. These theories may emphasise different aspects and 
offer different approaches and solutions to the dilemma, and even be in conflict with one 
another. Like in many other clinical situations in medicine, none is necessarily sufficient 
enough to be our sole moral and ethical compass.    
I believe that virtue ethics, and specifically the ethics of responsibility based on the virtue of 
phronesis, is the most appropriate moral theory to guide the healthcare practitioner when 
dealing with bio-ethical issues in everyday modern practice. This includes the situation when 
confronted with the ethical dilemma of divulging confidential information against 
someone’s wishes or invading someone’s privacy. I will argue this position in more detail 
below.    
Three other major theories and/or bio-ethical approaches, i.e. utilitarianism, deontology 
and the four principles of biomedical ethics as defined by Beauchamp and Childress (2013), 
will also briefly be discussed. The main purpose of the discussion on these three theories is 
to establish their relevance for this discourse, and in particular to identify any serious 
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conflict and contradictions which may exist amongst these different moral approaches as 
well as to identify some common ground.   
Other theories – libertarianism, egalitarianism, communitarianism, the ethics of care and 
casuistry - also have some aspects that may be applied to the deliberation, but these will 
not be dealt with in any detail, except for some passing comments. Even the individual 
freedom granted by liberal individualism is not absolute and unqualified. Confidentiality, as 
an exercise of our right to autonomy and therefore our individual freedom, is still limited to 
the extent that it may sometimes be overridden if such infringement on the rights of an 
individual is justified to prevent harm to others.  In the African context of Ubuntu, it may 
well be argued that communitarianism automatically places genetic information in the 
public domain, at least for the family. At the same time, cultural prejudice and beliefs in the 
African communities regarding the origin of disease may ostracise the individual harbouring 
the genetic abnormality. 
  
10.2 Virtue ethics  
 Introduction 10.2.1
The central focus of virtue ethics is the character of the person. Although Aristotle said “that 
a virtue is a trait of character manifested in habitual action”, Rachels and Rachels  (2012, 
p.159) give a more refined definition: “a moral virtue is a trait of character manifested in 
habitual action, that it is good for anyone to have.” This not only distinguishes it from vices 
(which are also character traits), but also brings a distinction between “moral” and 
“general” virtues. A virtue can also be regarded as the mean or midpoint of the range 
between two vices, e.g. courage as the mean between the two extremes of cowardice and 
foolhardiness. Prudence can be regarded as the midpoint between the vice of recklessness 
and the vice of avoiding danger at all costs (Van Niekerk 2011, p.31). 
“In Aristotle’s view the right act is that which a virtuous person would do in the 
circumstances” (Hope et. al. 2003, p.9). “The virtues are those characteristics that will 
ensure that those endowed with them will have the best life overall. The best life, for 
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Aristotle, is that associated with eudaemonia, often translated as flourishing” (op. cit.) This 
flourishing, according to the above authors  “can perhaps be seen as a kind of deep 
happiness, which is less connected with the pleasures than is the concept of happiness, or 
wellbeing, used to underpin utilitarianism.” Although it may be seen as a selfish or egoistic 
theory, as it emphasises one’s own flourishing, most virtues are not selfish. In fact, virtues 
like generosity and kindness will benefit those others in the immediate sphere of existence 
of a virtuous person. For me, flourishing is that deep sense of happiness and moral 
contentment experienced by the virtuous person upon the realisation of his moral actions. 
Although some interpersonal and intercultural differences may exist amongst the different 
virtues, some are universal and inherent to all moral agents – like honesty, generosity, 
courage. 
Virtue ethics is often said to have two selling points (Rachels and Rachels 2012, p.167). 
Firstly it supports moral motivation. We do not only do things because of an abstract sense 
of duty or from a desire to do the right thing. We do it because we have a sincere desire16 to 
do so, “and virtue is its own reward (Hope et. al. 2003, p.9). Secondly, although impartiality 
is a dominant theme in modern moral philosophy, for instance utilitarianism, some virtues 
are partial rather than impartial. The partial virtue of loyalty to our loved ones and friends, 
recognises and gives meaning to our special relationships.  
 
10.2.1.1 Possible criticism against virtue ethics. 
Like any other moral theory, virtue ethics is not immune to criticism. Some criticisms are 
aimed at the following: 
1. It may not be able to effectively guide action. Oakley (2012, p.99) doubt “whether 
the notion of virtue is clear or detailed enough to serve as the basis of a criterion of 
rightness”.  
2. The plurality of virtuous character traits is a potential problem as not all cultures 
and people may respond in the same way in similar situations. Virtues and the 
                                                          
16
 In Afrikaans the word “hartsbegeerte” would be appropriate to emphasise the sincerity of this desire. 
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interpretation thereof may differ from person to person, and from culture to 
culture. Some virtues, like loyalty, may even be associated with unethical behaviour, 
like gangsterism (Beauchamp and Childress 2013, p.383). The question may be 
asked, who performs the right virtuous action – a kind person, an honest person or 
a just person? 
3. As we live in an evolving and ever-changing society, some virtues which may have 
been acceptable years ago may no longer be regarded as virtues. For instance, 
paternalism, which was an acceptable virtue of medical doctors decades ago, is no 
longer regarded as a virtue in the modern Western culture recognising respect for 
patient autonomy (Hope et. al. 2003, p.10). 
4. Rachels and Rachels (2012, p.171) also raise the inability of virtues to solve conflict 
amongst them. It may sometimes be difficult to be honest and kind at the same 
time, if someone asks your opinion regarding an apparent disastrous new hairstyle.  
 
10.2.1.2 Strengths of virtue ethics 
However, virtue ethics definitely have some strengths: 
1. It emphasises some aspects of morality, which may not be important in other 
theories. Some hard or fast rules or acts may be morally acceptable, but virtue 
elevates it to something more serene.  
2. Gardiner (2003, p. 301) argues that virtues are the foundation of morally acceptable 
behaviour and conduct, from which all other duties and obligations will flow. In 
other words a virtuous person does not need another moral theory like deontology 
to guide him; his set of virtues will do so. He also believes that virtue ethics has a 
number of advantages over the four principles of Beauchamp and Childress. These 
include the recognition of our emotions as part of our moral perceptions, and also 
the motivation of the agent for sincerely wanting to do the right thing, and not 
merely following a set of principles or rules.  In other words, it provides a solid basis 
for moral motivation. 
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Against this background, I believe that virtue ethics is not an inferior or subordinate theory 
in comparison to the other major theories. This view is supported by Oakley (2012 p.100): 
It is true to say that virtue ethics does not deliver an “algorithm” of right action (as 
Aristotle put it), and that a virtue ethics criterion of rightness is perhaps less 
precisely specifiable and less easily applicable than that given by consequentialist 
theories (although perhaps not compared to those given by Kantian theories). But it 
is perhaps an overreaction to argue that this undermines virtue ethics’ claim to 
provide an acceptable approach to ethical justification. For virtue ethicists often give 
considerable detail about what virtuous agents have done and would do in certain 
situations, and these details can help us to identify what is right to do in a particular 
situation. (We might not gain any more precision from the directives of 
contemporary Kantian and consequentialist theories which advise us to do what a 
good Kantian or consequentialist agent would do.) And further, virtue ethics need 
not claim that there is only one true account of what a virtuous person would be and 
do, for it can allow that, sometimes, whichever of two courses of action one 
chooses, one would be acting rightly. (my emphasis) 
This emphasises one important aspect of virtue ethics. While consequentialist and Kantian 
theories allow only one action according to the acts, rules and duties, which need to be 
followed to address a particular moral dilemma, virtue ethics recognises the possibility that 
the same goal may be reached by the application of different virtues or the execution of 
different virtuous acts.   
 
 Virtue ethics and medicine 10.2.2
In his book, Albert Jonsen (1990) discusses the old ethics and those who exemplified those 
virtues associated with the old ethics. Hippocrates and the principle of non-maleficence, 
Richard Cabot and his emphasis on competence and the parable of the Good Samaritan and 
the virtue of compassion all serve as examples of some of those values expected from 
medical professionals to “serve our lords, the sick”. Today, with the pressure from health 
care funders and other institutions often dictating the way we treat our patients and 
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infringing on the doctor-patient relationship, it is even more important for medical 
professionals to build their practice of medicine on an incorruptible and virtuous basis. 
The medical profession has not been immune to scandals, including unethical and 
unprofessional behaviour as well as the exploitation of patients and their suffering. 
Nevertheless, it is still generally regarded as a virtuous profession, with some virtues seen as 
an integral requirement of the characteristics of a medical professional.  The list of virtues 
expected from a virtuous healthcare practitioner includes benevolence, compassion, 
conscientiousness, honesty, justice, etc.. Some of them, like the virtues of benevolence and 
justice, form the basis of the four principles of biomedical ethics (Beauchamp and Childress 
2013, p.381).  These authors have also identified five focal virtues which “provide a moral 
compass for health professionals” (ibid., p.37). These five focal virtues include compassion, 
trustworthiness, integrity, conscientiousness and discernment. This latter virtue, the virtue 
of discernment, is the bedrock of an ethics of responsibility and will be discussed in more 
detail below. It represents practical and moral wisdom, prudence and the Aristotelian 
concept of phronesis (Van Niekerk and Nortje 2013, p.30; Pellegrino and Thomasma 1993, 
p.84).  
As no moral or ethical theory, nor any principle, is able to address and solve all possible bio-
ethical dilemmas in medicine and life, the correct application of the most appropriate 
theory or principle in a given circumstance requires insight and practical wisdom to obtain 
the best possible solution. For instance, in the application of the four principles of 
biomedical ethics (Beauchamp and Childress 2013), our actual duty is ultimately determined 
through the processes of balancing and specification. Only practical wisdom enables us to 
objectively attach a weight to all the different options. It is therefore obvious that the health 
professional requires practical wisdom to be able to navigate the sometimes stormy waters 
between the Scylla and Charybdis of bio-ethics and the issues related thereto.    
 
 An ethics of responsibility 10.2.3
Van Niekerk and Nortje (2013) promote a framework for moral reasoning in bioethics based 
on an ethics of responsibility. According to them (2013, p.28) “to take or accept 
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responsibility means to be able to be held accountable for whatever decisions are taken, on 
the assumption that reason can be provided, that they have been thought through, and 
even though they might be fallible.” We can no longer morally hide behind moral rules, 
codes or rules, but “it demands that we be accountable for everything we invent and design 
in our attempts to construct, apply and evaluate our life ethos – i.e. the value system 
according to which we live.” Is an ethics of responsibility not a corollary from the First 
Aphorism of Hippocrates (as quoted in Jonsen 2006, p.669)? 
Life is short; the medical art is long. Opportunity is fleeting, experience perilous and 
decision difficult.  
Jonsen (2006) discusses the impact of medical technology on therapeutic freedom, and in 
particular that patients may feel that it is imperative to make use of a specific technology, 
even though it may be futile. According to him, the application of this aphorism allows for 
“the reconciliation of technology and therapeutic freedom” in making a clinical decision, “to 
do something at the right time, for the right reasons, to do so with the awareness of the 
possibility of failure and error and to take responsibility for the action” (ibid. p.672).  
I believe that this is exactly what an ethics of responsibility is advocating. Whether it is in 
deciding what an appropriate treatment option or use of technology might be, or, in 
keeping with this topic, the management of genetic information. 
The ethics of responsibility is based on two principles. First, we must accept that our 
framework for moral decision-making is not perfect and that it can fail. Secondly, our moral 
decision-making processes must take into account all important action guides, like moral 
rules, norms and principles, as well as what we ultimately want to achieve – it is “a 
knowledge of both means and ends” and the dynamics between these two are such that 
“the end that we choose will influence the means we adopt to acquire it, and vice versa” 
(Van Niekerk and Nortje 2013, p.30). 
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10.2.3.1 The virtue of phronesis 
According to Hofmann (2002, p.136), many individuals believe that medicine must be 
viewed as an art (téchnê), while others claim it to be a combination of art and science 
(episteme). There is also a third group who maintain that “the paradigm of medicine is to be 
found in the concept of practical reasoning (phronesis).”  
Aristotle used the term phronesis for the virtue of practical wisdom, “the capacity for moral 
insight, the capacity, in a given set of circumstances, to discern what moral choice or course 
of action is most conducive to the good of the agent or the activity in which the agent is 
engaged” (Pellegrino and Thomasma 1993, p.84).  
The concept of practical wisdom is regarded by Pellegrino and Thomasma as a keystone in 
medical virtue ethics, forming the “link between the intellectual virtues – those that dispose 
to truth (science, art, intuitive and theoretical wisdom, etc.) - and those that dispose to 
good character (temperance, courage, justice, generosity, etc.)” and labelled it “medicine’s 
indispensable virtue” (ibid., p. 84).   
Thomas Aquinas used the term prudence, taking into account not only Aristotle’s concept of 
phronesis, but also the “supernatural virtues of faith, hope and charity”, as well as the moral 
and intellectual Aristotelian virtues (ibid., p.85). For him, prudence was “a recta ratio 
agibilium, a right way of acting (op. cit.), taking both the intellectual aspects of the practice 
of medicine as well as the moral virtues into account. As already stated, prudence can also 
be regarded as midpoint between the vice of recklessness and the vice of avoiding danger at 
all costs (Van Niekerk 2011, p.31). 
Prudence, practical wisdom and phronesis all depend on the ability of practical reasoning.  
According to Kinsella (2012, p.35) “phronesis emphasises reflection (both deliberative and 
that revealed through action) as a means to inform wise action, to assist one to navigate the 
variable contexts of practice, and as directed towards the ends of practical wisdom.” 
Phronesis is the moral knowledge which enables, us through a process of deliberation, to 
“synchronise” that what is required by the situation, and that what can be done according 
to the moral virtues we adhere to. It allows us to find a moral solution for a particular 
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problem  against the universal background of virtue ethics. Van Niekerk and Nortje (op. cit.) 
states: “[I]n this sense, deliberation (the essence of phronesis) is a dialectic movement 
between guides to action and the requirements of the practical situation, as well as the 
possible consequences of the action”. 
 
10.2.3.2  A theory accepting the possibility of failure 
It is important to realise that this approach is neither perfect, nor fail-proof – it is an ethics 
of fallibility (ibid., p29). There will be times when we ultimately realise, often with the 
benefit of hindsight, that our decision was not the best one. This is permissible, as long as 
we can justify our decision with objective and scientifically supported arguments. The 
principle of diligens paterfamilias, the reasonable man, has long been accepted as an 
objective and impartial way to judge a medical practitioner.  In this process, the actions of 
an individual is judged against what his peer group would have done in a similar situation; 
not against that of a super-specialist working in optimal conditions. One can only assume 
that the same principle will apply when judging an unintentional wrongful decision by a 
health professional based on an ethics of responsibility. 
 
 Practical application of an ethics of responsibility in genetic dilemmas 10.2.4
With all the possible permutations encountered in medicine, and in genetics, it is impossible 
for any healthcare practitioner to have all the knowledge, all the time, when confronted 
with an ethical dilemma. 
Virtuosity is most probably the most important requirement for a health care worker to 
have. If you are not a virtuous person, what will drive you to conform to the rules of your 
profession?  As in the words of Van Niekerk (2011, p.29)  “the fundamental assumption of a 
virtue approach to ethics is that moral status is conferred on acts, not because of some 
characteristic of the act (as deontology asserts) or because of the consequences of the act 
(as utilitarianism asserts), but because of the character traits of the actor himself or herself.” 
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In practice, an approach along the lines of an ethics of responsibility is most probably the 
most practical way to translate ethical theory into practice, especially when superimposed 
on the principles of biomedical ethics, and in particular the principles of respect for 
autonomy, beneficence and non-maleficence. In applying the insight offered by the virtue of 
phronesis, the health care practitioner will be able to identify his actual moral duty through 
the processes of weighing and balancing, and execute it in a responsible manner. 
Even if it turns out retrospectively that the decision by the health care practitioner was not 
necessarily correct or the best available option, an ethics of responsibility accepts that we 
sometimes may or will fail, even though we may have had the most honourable moral 
intention. However, as long as we can justify our initial decision and proof that we acted 
with discernment and only in good faith, failure, although never the preferred end-result, 
will be permissible. 
An ethics of responsibility takes into account not only the rights of the index patient, but 
also the rights of others, as well as our duty to them. In genetic practice, the importance and 
potential consequences of a genetic abnormality to the family may be such, that the 
healthcare practitioner will act irresponsible if he conforms to the index patient’s wishes 
and withhold this information from the family.  Based on this moral approach, there is 
therefore a responsibility on the healthcare practitioner to inform at-risk family members, if 
he is unsuccessful to obtain the cooperation of the index patient.  
Although the decision of the healthcare practitioner to divulge confidential information to 
others, may on the face of it seems to “harm” the index patient, a virtuous healthcare 
practitioner will also be the first to extend other virtues, like compassion, to those who may 
have been “harmed” by his decision.    
 
10.3 A brief review of the other major moral theories and their 
relevance for this discourse 
As stated above, I believe that an ethics of responsibility based on the virtue of phronesis, 
discernment  or practical wisdom provides the best moral and ethical platform for the 
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healthcare worker to operate from when dealing with the thorny issues of medicine, and in 
this case the ownership of genetic information in particular. Nevertheless, it is always 
important, at least for the sake of constructive debate and reflection, not to view a 
particular moral approach in isolation, but also to view it against the background of other 
moral and ethical theories. In doing so, we can at least compare the different schools of 
thinking and identify aspects on which these theories may be in agreement or in conflict 
with one another.    
A brief review of three other major moral theories, i.e. utilitarianism, Kantian deontology 
and the principles of biomedical ethics as defined by Beauchamp and Childress (2013), will 
confirm that even when viewed from these particular moral viewpoints, a theory based on 
an ethics of responsibility cannot be criticised or regarded as inappropriate or irrelevant 
when dealing with issues related to the ownership of genetic information. 
 
 Utilitarian theory 10.3.1
Utilitarianism is the most prominent consequentialist theory. It accepts only one basic 
ethical principle, i.e. the principle of utility. The primary aim is to produce the greatest good 
(or the least possible harm) to the greatest number of individuals in an impartial manner, 
where everyone is equal and counts the same. 
According to the principle of universal utility, “an act is right if it brings about the greatest 
increase in the world of consequential good of all the alternative actions available, or the 
least increase in evil consequences of all the alternatives” (Hull 1979, p.2). This is a function 
of all the consequences, direct or indirect, predictable and unforeseeable. It is impartial, as 
everyone possibly affected by the act, counts the same weight. This act becomes one’s 
prima facie obligation. 
How judgment is reached through the decision making process to determine whether a 
particular act is of maximum utility or minimum disutility depends on whether an act 
utilitarian or rule utilitarian approach is followed. In the former the particular situation 
dictates the decision (act utilitarianism is also sometimes called situation ethics) (Hull 1979). 
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The rule utilitarian theory appeals to a rule to tell us what to do in a particular situation, and 
the rule with the greatest net utility then becomes the prima facie obligation.  It is 
important to remember that these rules can be revised if we know that a specific rule, like 
truth-telling, may not have the best consequences in a particular situation. Rachels and 
Rachels (2012, p. 120) see this move from act to rule utilitarianism as follows: “In shifting 
emphasis from the justification of acts to the justification of rules, utilitarianism has been 
brought into line with our intuitive judgments”.  These rules have to be constantly and 
indiscriminately obeyed. 
Health, like happiness and freedom, is often regarded as an agent neutral or intrinsic good; 
something each and everyone will value and strive for. I will, for the purpose of this 
discourse at least, focus on this set of values rather than the hedonistic values of happiness 
and pleasure as advocated by Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill (Rachels and Rachels 
2012, p.110), although it may be argued that a state of physical well-being as a reflection of 
one’s health status will ultimately result in happiness or pleasure. 
 
10.3.1.1 Relevance for this discourse 
Utilitarianism plays an important role in public and institutional policy-making. In public 
health, the aim is primarily based on beneficence- and non-maleficence; either to benefit or 
to prevent harm to the majority of society, whether this is through vaccinations, notification 
of disease or even institutionalisation of mentally ill individuals. In this regard, the people to 
benefit from such a consequence-based policy are usually unknown to the patient who may 
be the source of an outbreak of disease or potential threat to the society. If it is acceptable 
to “sacrifice” an individual’s privacy and confidentiality for the benefit of the anonymous 
masses, don’t identifiable family members have similar or even more rights to access of 
important genetic information when it comes to hereditary cancer syndromes and where 
surveillance or preventative surgery may protect them?  
When dealing with genetic information, one is in effect dealing with information which 
extends beyond the individual sphere. We are also dealing with information reflecting the 
(possible) genetic status of the family and even society. From a utilitarian perspective, it is 
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obvious that this information must be applied to the benefit of as many individuals as 
possible. It may be argued that utilitarianism holds us accountable not only for the 
execution of a good act (like informing at-risk family members), but also for preventing 
harm. This is obviously very relevant when dealing with genetic information, as an omission 
to inform other family members of a potential genetic risk may potentially harm these 
individuals.   The utilitarian will therefore argue that the breach of confidentiality and 
privacy is completely justifiable, given the positive impact dissemination of this information 
will have on the family and the community.  Genetic information regarding hereditary 
cancer syndromes is one such example where the benefit to the majority heavily outweighs 
the (potential) harm to the individual, using health and prevention of disease as the 
calculus. Having said this, this approach obviously infringes on the right to confidentiality 
and privacy of the index patient by supporting the “tyranny of the majority” (Rachels and 
Rachels 2012, p.115). 
Is the latter situation justifiable from a utilitarian perspective? Applying health and the 
prevention of disease as the calculus of utility, it seems as if there can be no moral objection 
to veto someone’s refusal to divulge this type of information as long as all reasonable steps 
are taken to protect the privacy of the family as a whole.  
 
 Kantian deontology 10.3.2
Deontological theories (from the Greek deon, meaning duty) are based on the principle that 
one must choose your actions according to standards of duty or obligation that refer not to 
the consequences, but to the nature of the action. These theories are also called duty-based 
moral theories. Hull (1979, p.4) states that deontologists are often also absolutists, “but 
some deontologists do hold that what is morally right in a given situation may differ from 
what is morally right in any other given situation”. 
A central theme in the argument of deontologists is the fact that consequences do not 
count; a morally wrong act may have entirely good consequences, but it is not permitted. 
Along the same line, a morally right act may have entirely bad consequences, but still needs 
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to be executed. For consequentialists “good is right”, while deontologists hold that “right is 
good”. 
A distinction is also made between act and rule deontologists, and the best-known rule 
deontology theories include religious rule deontology and Immanuel Kant’s rational rule 
deontology (Hull 1979). This “rule morality” may either confer a positive duty (what we 
must do) or a negative duty (what me must refrain from doing).  
Kant formulated two types of imperatives, i.e. the hypothetical and categorical imperatives. 
The former is conditional and non-compulsory, and merely indicates what an individual 
must do in order to achieve a specific end-result or goal. A categorical imperative defines an 
unconditional command or rule that has to be executed.  
Kant (1964) as cited by Van Niekerk (2011, p.26) formulated two versions of the categorical 
imperative: 
a) “Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should 
become a universal law”, and 
b) “Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in 
the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an 
end.”  
 
10.3.2.1 Relevance for this discourse 
When applying Kant’s two categorical imperatives to this discourse, it does appear as if 
these imperatives may be in conflict with one another. 
The first formulation of the categorical imperative has as its basis the principle that 
whichever rule or maxim an individual decides to apply to a particular situation or dilemma, 
must be the same rule he or she would desire everyone else also ought to apply in a similar 
situation. In very simple terms, it is almost a matter of “what is good for the goose, is good 
for the gander”.  
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I believe the first formulation of the categorical imperative speaks to the sharing of genetic 
information amongst family members. If an individual states that he himself would prefer to 
be informed of any possible genetic risks, which his or her family may harbour, one can then 
assume that he will offer that same information to other family members at risk if he was to 
be the index patient. In executing this maxim, the family will then all subscribe to the 
concept of a joint account as defined by Parker and Lucassen (2004). According to them, the 
shared genetic material amongst family members must be viewed as a “joint” account 
rather than a “personal” account. By doing so, the knowledge of a hereditary cancer 
syndrome and the duty to share that information with family members will become 
“universalised” at least amongst the family members, to the effect that this information will 
be available to all family members. This is presumably the position any member of a family, 
even the index patient if he were not in the specific position of being the first member of a 
family to be diagnosed with a hereditary cancer syndrome, would prefer to be in if another 
of his family served to be the index patient.  
The second formulation appears to promote the opposite argument. By divulging 
confidential genetic information against the wishes of the patient, and with the primary aim 
to benefit other at-risk family members, it may well be argued that we are only treating the 
index patient as a means to benefit others and not as an end in himself. From a scientific 
perspective, hereditary cancer syndromes tend to blur the concepts of “a means” and “an 
end”. The index patient may have already manifested some of the genetic abnormalities on 
a clinical level. He has already been diagnosed with cancer and knowledge of his genetic 
status may be of little further value to him. (There are exceptions as already alluded to. In 
some syndromes, like Lynch syndrome, patients may be at risk for the development of 
metachronous tumours, and surveillance of the other organs at risk is indicated.)  He has 
gained maximum information and subsequent benefit from the identification of the genetic 
abnormality. I do not believe that divulging that information to family members at-risk, is 
treating the index patient as a means to their end, as that information already served him as 
an end in himself.  
One of the problems with Kantian theory is the overemphasis it places on duty, while at the 
same time it underemphasises special relationships, like that between different family 
members (Beauchamp and Childress 2013, p.366). In practice, this theory requires us to 
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uphold the rules and duties in all circumstances.  This may result in a conflict of duties – a 
typical problem of Kantianism - and require us to lie to the family member of a newly 
diagnosed hereditary cancer patient if we are specifically asked whether he or she may be at 
risk or not, and we do not have the consent of the index patient to divulge that information. 
The motive of duty is so overwhelming, that the deontologist often lacks sympathy, 
compassion and the other humane attributes so important in the practice of medicine. 
Withholding this important information is in conflict with a utilitarian approach where we 
seek to do good or prevent harm to the greatest number of people, in this case the patient 
and his or her offspring.  
 
 The principles of biomedical ethics 10.3.3
Beauchamp and Childress (2013) developed a model for biomedical ethical deliberation 
based on four principles, i.e. respect for autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and 
justice. Since its first publication in 1979 and spanning seven editions, Principles of 
biomedical ethics has become an important textbook and source of information and 
guidance for many health care workers, or, for that matter, anyone confronted with 
bioethical issues. DeGrazia (2003, p.219) believes that it would be difficult “to find a text 
that has been more influential and more frequently cited”. He also commends the authors 
for their willingness to implement change, and regards it as one of the book’s strengths.  
The book, sometimes negatively referred to as the Georgetown mantra or “principlism”  as 
it tends to imply that those “chanting” the four principles may see themselves as bio-
ethicists although they may lack any formal training, has also drawn more than its fair share 
of criticism through the years (DeGrazia 2003, p.220), with Bernard Gert, H Danner Glouser 
and Charles Culver the most unsparing critics (Beauchamp and Childress 2013). The fact that 
the four principles lack the support of an overarching ethical theory has always been 
criticised. In the first three editions there was some reference to ethical theories which 
could support these principles. Beauchamp and Childress, despite their preference for rule-
utilitarianism and rule-deontology respectively, were from the beginning pluralistic in their 
approach to identify a moral foundation to base the principles on (DeGrazia 2003). In the 
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fifth edition the idea of a common morality was embodied as the ultimate source of moral 
principles and norms.  
The concept of a common morality forms an integral component of the four principles 
approach. Beauchamp and Childress (2013, p.3 and p.417) define the common morality as 
“the set of universal norms shared by all persons committed to morality”. Gillon (1995, 
p.323), a fierce supporter of the four principles approach, states that “it seems to cut across 
national, cultural, religious, political and philosophical divisions and to provide a common 
set of prima facie moral commitments, a common moral language and a common moral-
analytic framework for biomedical ethics.”  
Beauchamp and Childress promote an integrated model, which is based on considered 
judgments and reflective equilibrium.  In this model, there is a constant flow of information 
between principles and rules at the top and cases below, through a bidirectional inductive 
and deductive flow. The considered judgments are those most “pure”, undistorted and 
unbiased judgements in which we do experience no problem to decide what is “right” and 
“wrong”. These reflect the common morality. These considered judgments are the fixed 
points on our moral compass. The second component of this model is the application of 
John Rawls’ “reflective equilibrium” to “match, prune and adjust considered judgments, 
their specifications and other beliefs to render them coherent.” (Beauchamp and Childress 
2013, p.405).  This process is by the nature of it, a continuing process in search of 
coherence, where we constantly align our moral theory with the considered judgment or 
vice versa, whenever conflict arises. This process assists us to use a process of specification 
to apply the principles in a particular situation, to formulate a set of the most appropriate 
principles and rules to solve a particular dilemma.  By going through this process, we are 
thus able to identify our actual duty from the set of prima facie duties.  
According to Childress (2012, p.67) “a principle-based approach must, as a minimum, hold 
that some general norms or action guides are central in moral reasoning”. Although 
principles and rules both define norms, the former are of a more general nature, while rules 
tend to be more specific. Principles are therefore more content-thin while rules tend to be 
specific and content-rich. The formulation of a rule out of a specific principle is a progressive 
process in which the concept is refined – this process is called specification. “Principles often 
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provide warrants for more specific rules, while rules specify more concretely the type of 
prohibited, required, or permitted action” (Childress 2012, p.67). Beauchamp (2003, p.269) 
states the following regarding specification: 
“Secondly, these abstract principles need to be specified to make them suitable for 
the analysis of a context, case, or policy. Specification is a process of reducing the 
indeterminateness of general norms to give them increased action guiding capacity, 
while retaining the moral commitments in the original norm. Filling out the 
commitments of the norms with which one starts, is accomplished by narrowing the 
scope of the norms.” 
W.D. Ross developed the concept of prima facie duties. According to Beauchamp et. al. 
(2008, p. 27): 
 “A prima facie duty is a duty that is always to be acted upon unless it conflicts on a 
particular occasion with an equal or stronger duty. A prima facie duty, then, is always 
right and binding, all other things being equal; it is conditional on not being overridden 
or outweighed by competing moral demands.” 
The four principles are equal in standing without moral priority of one over the others. They 
are all prima facie duties and when in conflict with one another the actual duty must be 
determined through the processes of weighing and balancing. These processes are not only 
dictated to some extent by the common morality, but the final action (or lack of it) must 
also fall within the ethical and moral borders as defined by the common morality. 
 
10.3.3.1 Relevance for this discourse 
Three of the principles, respect for autonomy, beneficence and non-maleficence, are central 
to this discourse. 
The principle of respect for autonomy can be stated as a negative or positive obligation 
(Beauchamp and Childress 2013, p.107). The negative obligation requires “that autonomous 
actions not to be subjected to controlling constraints by others”. Exceptions may exist, and 
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these valid exceptions are incorporated through a process of specification. The positive 
obligation “requires both respectful treatment in disclosing information, and actions that 
foster autonomous decision-making” (op. cit.). Obligations created by the principle of 
autonomy are (1) informed consent, (2) confidentiality, (3) truth telling and (4) effective 
communication.  
The principle of nonmaleficence imposes an obligation not to inflict harm on others. In 
medical ethics it is closely associated with the maxim primum non nocere, or “above all [or 
first] do no harm” (Beauchamp and Childress 2013, p.151). Nonmaleficence requires 
intentionally refraining from actions that cause harm, while beneficence is based on positive 
actions. Generally, obligations of nonmaleficence are more stringent than obligations of 
beneficence, and, in some cases, nonmaleficence overrides beneficence (op. cit.).  
A beneficial action does not necessarily take second place to an act of avoiding harm (ibid., 
p.152). There is no rule in ethics which favours avoiding harm over providing benefit; one 
clinical example is weighing up the risks and benefits of oncotherapy in treating cancer. In 
the context of genetic information, maintaining and respecting confidentiality and privacy 
are not absolute rights or duties. If the index patient refuses that this information is 
disseminated, and it is known that access to this information will be beneficial to other 
family members, then the benefits (to the family) outweigh the harm it may cause (to the 
index patient). Our actual duty will then be to act benevolent to the at-risk family, although 
there will be disrespect for the index patient’s autonomy. Except for the loss of 
confidentiality and privacy, this act will result in no other harm or maleficence to the index 
patient; in fact, it will save the family from the latter.      
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11 Conclusion 
The scope of medicine, like any other scientific field, is constantly changing due to the 
development of new technology, which not only improves our diagnostic ability and 
accuracy, but also our ability to predict the risk for the development of a disease and its 
prognosis. Although these changes give us a far better understanding of the science we 
practise, it often also raises its own unique moral and ethical issues. Like any other scientific 
discipline, it is important that new technology, knowledge and information be applied (as far 
as possible) to the benefit of not only the human species, but also to the benefit of other 
species, our environment, our world and universe. If not, we always stand the risk of 
abusing this newly acquired scientific ability and skills to the detriment of ourselves and one 
another. A state of technological chaos and disorder, very similar to the “state of nature”  as 
formulated by Thomas Hobbes, and also often portrayed in science fiction movies, will 
evolve. In this state, and in the context of this thesis, the abuse of genetic information will 
become yet another weapon to inflict damage to ourselves and others.  
Molecular pathology, including genetics, is at present one of the fastest developing 
pathology disciplines, changing the way we practice all other medical disciplines, including 
histopathology, haematology, and microbiology. It is the duty of philosophers and bio-
ethicists to assist science in implementing new scientific developments in a responsible, and 
morally and ethically acceptable manner. This includes developing moral and ethical 
principles regarding the management of genetic information, to ensure its optimal use and 
application to the benefit of all interested parties.  
Let us first look at the future prospects of genetic medicine as such, and finally conclude 
with a few comments on the main issues discussed in this document. 
The practice of medicine is moving more and more into the scope of so-called P4 medicine. 
The convergence of systems biology, the digital revolution and consumer-driven healthcare 
is transforming medicine from its current predominantly reactive mode, which is focused on 
treating disease, to “a pro-active P4 medicine that is predictive, preventive, personalized 
and participatory” (Hood and Flores 2012, p.614).   
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Urban (2015, p.547) believes that precision medicine, similar to the above P4 system, will be 
the paradigm for medicine in future. This will define an individual’s illness on a genetic and 
biochemical level. He believes it will have far-reaching effects, including changing the 
International Classification of Disease (ICD) coding system, the use of health records and 
even health care funding. 
Technical advances in the analysis of genetic information through modern techniques like 
next generation sequencing supported by unlimited information technology systems will be 
the basis for this new way we practise medicine, or more importantly, how the public 
manages their own health and all data pertaining to it. In future, the amount of health 
information flowing between patient, health care practitioner, health care provider and 
other interested third parties will be vast. It may be very difficult, if not impossible, to police 
the maintenance of confidentiality and privacy of information, including genetic 
information. 
At the same time, we are starting to view disease, and even social behaviour, from a less 
discriminative perspective. We accept the science behind psychological disturbances, even 
to its genetic level.  The concept of disease has lost its stigma; people with neurological 
debilitating diseases like Parkinson’s disease or post-stroke conditions are now part of 
public life. Thirty years ago, it was almost a social taboo for someone with debilitating 
diseases to openly socialise in public. The same applies to oncotherapy; cancer patients no 
longer hide in shame, but use their alopecic heads as a strong message to campaign for the 
prevention and screening of cancer. 
We have only traversed the proverbial peak of the iceberg related to genetic information. 
Some other issues, central as well as more peripheral to this debate, were not discussed in 
any detail. These include issues surrounding adult-onset diseases and the rights of children, 
as well as the rights of future, still to be born, generations.  There are many other issues 
which are just as important, including direct to consumer (DTC) testing, the performance of 
testing on “vulnerable” individuals (like  prisoners and the mentally ill), etc.  Research done 
on genetics, including biobanking, is a topic which by its comprehensive  nature justifies a 
discussion of its own, and will not be dealt with in any detail. Some of the problems unique 
to this field of medicine are the further management of incidental findings discovered in the 
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genome of individuals during research. These are so-called “variants of unknown 
significance” (Urban 2015, p.545). This is problematic as the exact risk harboured by these 
abnormalities cannot be predicted or has not yet been quantified. A word, which has also 
appeared in the genetic vocabulary, is the so-called “incidentalome”17 This “incidentalome” 
debate is now central in the discussion of the right to know or not to know in relation to 
biobank research (Chadwick et. al. 2014, p.55).  
In this thesis only two issues were discussed. First, it is obvious that the concepts of 
phenotype and genotype can no longer be viewed as two completely separate entities. They 
have merged, and to such an extent, that is more practical to view them as a unified 
concept. Therefore, we need to change the way we obtain consent for surgical procedures 
and histopathology examinations. The consent must be comprehensive and all-inclusive, 
and must include the genetic analysis for both somatic and germline mutations. This will 
enable the histopathologist to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the specimen. Not only 
will this enable the pathologist to comment on the susceptibility of the tumour to treatment 
as well as the prognosis of the patient, but it will also allow for the diagnosis of hereditary 
cancer syndromes. In addition, I foresee that the inclusion of genetic information as part of 
the histopathology diagnosis will become the norm in the future, as will soon be the case 
with nervous system tumours (Louis et. al. 2014).  
Secondly, I have discussed the legal and moral/ethical ramifications regarding the 
dissemination of information regarding the presence of a hereditary cancer syndrome. From 
a legal perspective, I do believe that refusal by the index patient to inform at-risk family 
members, does allow the further dissemination of such information, on condition that the 
index patient is informed and offered the opportunity to cooperate. This position is also 
supported by the professional guidelines in South Africa as well as elsewhere. 
From an ethical and moral perspective, I believe that the bio-ethical dilemmas encountered 
in modern medicine, including the issue regarding genetic information, can best be solved 
along the lines of an ethics of responsibility. In this virtue-based theory, the virtue of 
phronesis or practical wisdom is the guiding factor. Although we may sometimes be wrong 
                                                          
17
 Incidental and unexpected findings in clinical medicine are a well-known phenomenon. In radiology 
something unexpected may be noted on an image, and sometimes the clinical significance of this incidental 
finding, refer to as an incidentalome, may be unknown.  
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in our bio-ethical decisions, it will not fault us as long as we can justify our good intentions 
and actions made based on practical wisdom applied to a specific scenario. 
I believe that none of the other major moral and ethical theories is in conflict with this 
approach. The utilitarian strives to use this information to do good or prevent harm to the 
greatest number (i.e. the family). The deontologist bases his argument on the first 
categorical imperative, that we must do to others, what we would like others to do to us in 
a similar situation, i.e. by sharing information which may be of benefit. The actual duty of 
the principlist to inform the at-risk family members is formulated by weighing up respect for 
autonomy of the index patient with the beneficence to the family and the harm 
(maleficence) it may cause to both the index patient and the family. 
The ultimate value of genetic information is in its benefit to us all. Let us start to 
“desensitise” the moral issues around the confidentiality and privacy pertaining to genetic 
information; let us start to use that vast knowledge and information obtain from genetic 
testing in a responsible and fair manner to the benefit of all – the index patient, the family 
and ultimately humankind. 
Genetic information regarding a hereditary cancer syndrome does offer us the chance to 
make a difference in the life of others.   
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12 Annexure A 
Lynch Syndrome 
Lynch syndrome (LS) (Vogelzang 2013) is a syndrome with an autosomal dominant 
inheritance pattern, characterised by an earlier age of development for colorectal 
carcinoma as well as a higher risk for other cancers. It was previously called hereditary 
nonpolyposis colorectal carcinoma (HNPCC), but as there is a risk for cancers other than 
colorectal carcinoma, the preferred terminology is now Lynch Syndrome. 
Approximately 3% of colorectal carcinomas are caused by LS. These carcinomas typically 
occur at an earlier average age than in the general population (45 years versus 63 years) and 
most (70-85%) are proximal to the splenic flexure, therefore having a right-sided 
predilection. These tumours show an accelerated carcinogenesis with small polyps 
transforming within 2 to 3 years into carcinomas.  In addition, there is a high risk of 25 – 
30% for the development of either synchronous or metachronous colorectal carcinomas. 
There is an increased risk for malignancy at extracolonic sites:  
 endometrium (40 – 60% lifetime risk for female carriers); 
 ovary (12 – 15% lifetime risk for female carriers); 
 stomach; 
 small bowel; 
 hepatopancreaticobiliary system; 
 upper uro-genital tract, like transitional cell carcinoma of the renal pelvis; 
 prostate (although this is controversial); 
 breast; 
 adrenal cortex; 
 brains (glioblastoma); and 
 skin tumours, like sebaceous adenoma and carcinoma and multiple 
keratoacanthomas in the Muir-Torre variant of LS. 
These tumours tend to be often poorly differentiated with mucinous and signet-ring cell 
features, a Crohn’s-like reaction and intra-epithelial lymphocytes. The survival rate for 
colorectal carcinoma is higher. 
There are sets of criteria (Bethesda and Amsterdam) which can be used by clinicians to 
determine the risk for an individual to suffer from LS. 
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The diagnosis depends on the demonstration of a germline mutation in a mismatch repair 
(MMR) gene. These genes are MLH1, MSH2, MSH6 and PMS2, although for completeness 
the EPCAM gene is also sometimes included (although it is strictly speaking not a MMR 
gene, but causes MSH2 inactivation). A loss of MMR genes result in the accumulation of 
defective microsatellites, leading to  microsatellite instability (MSI) which puts the patient at 
risk for the development of cancer due to the potential accumulation of genetic defective 
material. 
In normal practice, based on the clinical history and the morphological findings, the 
histopathologist will consider the possibility of LS. Immunohistochemistry (IHC) can then be 
performed to demonstrate loss of one or more of the MMR genes. Alternatively 
microsatellite stability status can be tested for, and classified as low (MSI-Low) or high (MSI-
High). However, this is not diagnostic for LS, as loss of MLH1 may for instance also be due to 
hypermethylisation18. Therefore, genetic testing has to be performed for confirmation of 
the genetic disease. The ethical issue is when consent for genetic testing is required; is it 
required for immunohistochemistry or MSI testing, or only for genetic testing itself. There 
are two schools of thought. The one believes it is only required for the genetic testing as 
such, whilst the other believes it is even required for the immunohistochemistry and MSI 
testing as it is a form of genetic screening (Chubak et al 2011; EGAPP Working Group 2011; 
Williams & Williams 2011). 
                                                          
18
 DNA methylation is one of the two main epigenetic mechanisms, the other mechanism being histone 
modification (Griffith and Stotz 2013, p. 116). 
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